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ABSTRACT
COUNTERACTING FREE RIDING IN PURE
PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS
K. Murat KARAKAYA
Ph.D. in Computer Engineering
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. O¨zgu¨r Ulusoy
Asst. Prof. Dr. I˙brahim Ko¨rpeog˘lu
March, 2008
The peer-to-peer (P2P) network paradigm has attracted a signiﬁcant amount of
interest as a popular and successful alternative to traditional client-server model
for resource sharing and content distribution. However, researchers have observed
the existence of high degrees of free riding in P2P networks which poses a serious
threat to eﬀectiveness and eﬃcient operation of these networks, and hence to
their future. Therefore, eliminating or reducing the impact of free riding on P2P
networks has become an important issue to investigate and a considerable amount
of research has been conducted on it.
In this thesis, we propose two novel solutions to reduce the adverse eﬀects of free
riding on P2P networks and to motivate peers to contribute to P2P networks.
These solutions are also intended to lead to performance gains for contributing
peers and to penalize free riders. As the ﬁrst solution, we propose a distributed
and localized scheme, called Detect and Punish Method (DPM), which depends
on detection and punishment of free riders. Our second solution to the free riding
problem is a connection-time protocol, called P2P Connection Management Pro-
tocol (PCMP), which is based on controlling and managing link establishments
among peers according to their contributions.
To evaluate the proposed solutions and compare them with other alternatives,
we developed a new P2P network simulator and conducted extensive simulation
experiments. Our simulation results show that employing our solutions in a P2P
network considerably reduces the adverse eﬀects of free riding and improves the
overall performance of the network. Furthermore, we observed that P2P networks
utilizing the proposed solutions become more robust and scalable.
Keywords: Free riding, Peer-to-Peer networks, distributed computing, perfor-
mance evaluation.
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O¨ZET
YAPISAL OLMAYAN ES¸LER ARASI BI˙LGI˙SAYAR
AG˘LARINDA KATKISIZ KATILIMI ENGELLEME
K. Murat KARAKAYA
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Doktora
Tez Yo¨neticileri: Prof. Dr. O¨zgu¨r Ulusoy
Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. I˙brahim Ko¨rpeog˘lu
Mart, 2008
Es¸ler arası bilgisayar agˇları yaklas¸ımı kaynak paylas¸ımı ve ic¸erik dagˇıtımında
geleneksel istemci-sunumcu yaklas¸ımına kars¸ı yaygın ve bas¸arılı bir sec¸enek olarak
oldukc¸a dikkat c¸ekmektedir. Ancak, aras¸tırmacılar es¸ler arası bilgisayar agˇlarının
etkin ve verimli c¸alıs¸masını, dolayısıyla, bu yaklas¸ımın gelecegˇini ciddi olarak
tehdit eden o¨nemli miktarda “katkısız katılımı” bu agˇlarda go¨zlemlemis¸lerdir.
Bu nedenle, katkısız katılımın es¸ler arası bilgisayar agˇları u¨zerindeki olumsuz et-
kisini azaltmak veya kaldırmak o¨nemli bir aras¸tırma konusu haline gelmis¸ ve bu
alanda bir c¸ok c¸alıs¸ma yapılmıs¸tır.
Bu tezde, katkısız katılımın es¸ler arası bilgisayar agˇları u¨zerindeki olumsuz et-
kisinin azaltılması ve kullanıcıların katkı yapmaya tes¸vik edilmesi maksadıyla
iki yeni yaklas¸ım o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu ana yaklas¸ımlar, katkıda bulunan kul-
lanıcıların bas¸arımını artırırken katkısız kullanıcıları cezalandırmayı sagˇlayacak
s¸ekilde tasarlanmıs¸tır. Birinci ana yaklas¸ımda, katkısız kullanıcıların tespiti ve
cezandırılmasına dayanan dagˇıtık ve yerselles¸tirilmis¸ bir c¸o¨zu¨m o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu
yaklas¸ım, Bul ve Cezalandır Yo¨ntemi olarak adlandırılmıs¸tır. Es¸ler Arası Bagˇlantı
Yo¨netim Protokolu¨ adı verilen ikinci ana yaklas¸ımda ise, kullanıcılar arasındaki
bagˇlantıları kullanıcıların katkısına go¨re yo¨netmeyi esas alan bagˇlantı tabanlı bir
c¸o¨zu¨m o¨nerilmis¸tir.
O¨nerilen ana yaklas¸ımları degˇerlendirmek ic¸in yeni bir simu¨lato¨r gelis¸tirilmis¸
ve bir c¸ok deney yapılmıs¸tır. Simu¨lasyon sonuc¸ları go¨stermis¸tir ki o¨nerilen
ana yaklas¸ımların kullanılması, katkısız katılımın es¸ler arası bilgisayar agˇları
u¨zerindeki olumsuz etkisini azaltmıs¸ ve genelde bas¸arımı artırmıs¸tır. Bunlara ek
olarak, o¨nerilen ana yaklas¸ımları kullanan agˇlar daha gu¨c¸lu¨ ve daha o¨lc¸eklenebilir
hale gelmis¸lerdir.
v
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Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Bilgisayar ag˘larının katkısız kullanımı, Es¸ler arası bilgisayar
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The peer-to-peer (P2P) networking paradigm has attracted signiﬁcant interest
because of its capacity for resource sharing and content distribution. There are
various architectures and applications of P2P networking, including ﬁle sharing,
distributed computing, storage, collaboration, and multimedia streaming. In
the ideal case, peers are expected to contribute to a P2P network by sharing
their resources in turn of utilizing the network and the other peers’ resources.
However, it is observed that in many P2P networks, a considerable portion of
peers are reluctant to share their resources [3, 46, 48, 93, 101]. Thus, the primary
property of P2P networks, the implicit or explicit functional cooperation and
resource contribution of peers, may fail and lead to a situation called free riding.
In P2P context, free riding means exploiting P2P network resources (through
searching, downloading, or using services) without contributing to the network.
A free rider is a peer that uses the P2P network services but does not contribute
to the network or the other peers at an acceptable level. A contributor, on the
other hand, is a peer that makes enough contribution to the network by sharing
its resources with the other peers.
There may be various reasons and motivations for free riding. Bandwidth limi-
tation of peers’ connections may be one reason for free riding. Another reason
for free riding can be the peers’ concern of sharing “illegal” data on their own
computers even though they are not concerned about using this type of data.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Some peers also have security concerns if they share something.
Researchers have observed the existence of high degrees of free riding in P2P
networks, and they argue that free riding can become an important threat against
the existence and eﬃcient operation of P2P networks [3, 37]. As a result, a
considerable amount of research has been done on free riding issue to diminish
the impact of it on P2P networks.
In this dissertation, we propose two diﬀerent solutions to deal with the free riding
problem. These solutions aim to promote cooperation among peers and discour-
age free riding. As the ﬁrst solution, we propose a distributed and localized
framework which is based on detection and punishment of free riders. We call
this framework Detect and Punish Method (DPM). Our second solution to the
free riding problem is a connection-based framework, which we call P2P Connec-
tion Management Protocol (PCMP).
In DPM, we aim to design a framework which detects free riders and takes some
counter actions against them. Thus, DPM consists of two separate mechanisms.
The ﬁrst mechanism is for detecting free riders by monitoring network traﬃc
among one-hop neighboring peers. The second mechanism is for taking discour-
aging counter actions against the detected free riding peers. The mechanisms are
distributed and localized. Basically, each peer is required to monitor its one-hop
neighbors to decide if any of these peers is a free rider or not. Then the peer is
required to take actions against the detected free riders.
The second framework, PCMP, introduces a novel P2P connection type, One-
Way-Request Connection (OWRC) and a P2P connection management protocol
that dynamically establishes the OWRCs between peers, and adaptively modiﬁes
the P2P topology in reaction to the observed contributions of peers. We de-
signed PCMP based on the idea that if we can adjust the P2P network topology
dynamically in reaction to peers’ contributions, the adapted topology can favor
the contributing peers in getting service from the P2P network. The adapted
topology can also exclude free riders from the P2P network, and in this way the
adverse eﬀects of free riding can be reduced as well.
We implemented our solutions in a custom P2P network simulation tool that we
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developed as part of this dissertation as well. Using our tool, we conducted exten-
sive simulation experiments to evaluate our solutions and compare them against
some alternatives. Our simulation results show that utilizing our frameworks
leads to signiﬁcant performance improvements for P2P networks. Furthermore,
we observed that P2P networks employing the proposed free riding mechanisms
become more robust and scalable.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• A detailed survey of free riding in P2P networks conducted,
• A custom-designed pure P2P network simulation tool developed,
• A novel P2P network connection type and its management protocol pro-
posed,
• A classiﬁcation of observed free riding in P2P networks provided,
• Two novel frameworks against free riding designed, a detailed implemen-
tation of them in our simulator provided, and extensive simulation experi-
ments performed to evaluate the frameworks,
• Impact of possible attacks and malicious acts against the implementation
of the proposed frameworks evaluated.
The contributions presented in this dissertation have been published in two jour-
nals and a conference proceedings. Below is the list of these publications:
• M. Karakaya, I˙. Ko¨rpeog˘lu, and O¨. Ulusoy, “Counteracting Free Riding in
Peer-to-Peer Networks”, Computer Networks, Volume 52, Issue 3, February
2008.
• M. Karakaya, I˙. Ko¨rpeog˘lu, and O¨. Ulusoy, “A Connection Management
Protocol for Promoting Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks”, Computer
Communications, Volume 31, Issue 2, February 2008.
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• M. Karakaya, I˙. Ko¨rpeog˘lu, and O¨. Ulusoy, “A Distributed and
Measurement-Based Framework Against Free Riding in Peer-to-Peer Net-
works (short paper)”, IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Com-
puting (P2P’04), August 2004, Zurich, Switzerland.
• M. Karakaya, I˙. Ko¨rpeog˘lu, and O¨. Ulusoy, “GnuSim: A Gnutella Net-
work Simulator”, Technical Report BU-CE-0505, Department of Computer
Engineering, Bilkent University, 2005.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
In the next chapter, we provide the background and related work for P2P networks
and the free riding issue. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we present our solutions to
the free riding problem, DPM and PCMP respectively. The P2P simulation tool
GNUSIM is presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we provide detailed results
of our simulation study using GNUSIM for both solutions along with possible
attacks to them. At the end of Chapter 6, we also compare the solutions and
their performance. Finally, we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Related Work and Background
Eliminating or reducing the impact of free riding on P2P networks has become
an important research ﬁeld in which a considerable amount of research has been
done. In this chapter, we ﬁrst have a discussion on classiﬁcation of P2P networks,
based on a variety of criteria. Then, we elaborate on the free riding problem in
each class of P2P networks, along with the proposed solutions. Some possible
attacks against these solutions are also discussed at the end of this chapter.
2.1 P2P Network Types
The impact of free riding and the eﬀectiveness of a possible solution are related
with the P2P network features and the provided P2P services. Therefore, before
discussing the free riding issue further, we ﬁrst would like to go brieﬂy over various
types of P2P networks in this section, and discuss how free riding can aﬀect each
of those in the next section.
P2P networks can be classiﬁed according to a variety of criteria [6, 68, 72] (see
Table 2.1). One possible classiﬁcation can be based on two features of networks;
the “degree of centralization” and “degree of structure”. The degree of centraliza-
tion determines to what extent the P2P network relies on servers (none or some)
to assist the interaction between peers, whereas the degree of structure refers to
the way in which the content is indexed and located in the network. Using these
5
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two criteria P2P networks can be classiﬁed into three types: centralized, decen-
tralized but structured (hybrid), and decentralized and unstructured (pure). In
centralized P2P networks there is a constantly-updated central directory which is
used by peers to ﬁnd out the location of resources. Decentralized but structured
P2P networks (hybrid) do not have any central directory but they are structured,
i.e., P2P network topology is ﬁrmly controlled and ﬁle indices are systematically
placed at peers, following a certain algorithm. In this way queries can be re-
solved eﬃciently. In decentralized and unstructured (pure) P2P networks, there
is no centralized directory and not much control over the network topology. The
placement of ﬁle indices, if there is any, is not based on any knowledge of the
topology and ﬁle indices are not related with each other. The most typical query
method in such networks is ﬂooding.
Criterion P2P Network Types
Degree of centralization and Centralized,
structure Decentralized but structured (Hybrid),
and Decentralized and unstructured (Pure).
Provided services Distributed computing, P2P storage,
File sharing, Collaboration, Platforms,
Multimedia streaming, etc.
Legality of the shared content All legal and Mostly illegal.
Table 2.1: P2P network types.
Another possible classiﬁcation of P2P networks is with regards to the type
of services provided by them, such as distributed computing (e.g., Avaki [9],
Entropia [28], SETI@home [90]), storage (e.g., Freenet [33], Free Haven [34],
OceanStore [77], PAST [78]), ﬁle sharing (e.g., BitTorrent [11], Gnutella [18],
Napster [75], Publius [81]), collaboration (e.g., Jabber [50], Groove [38]), platforms
(e.g., JXTA [56], MS .NET [74], the P2PTrusted Library [97]), and multimedia
streaming (e.g., Freecast [32], Peercast [79], PPLive [80], UUSee [99]).
P2P networks can also be categorized according to the legality of the shared con-
tent in the network. For example, some P2P networks, such as oﬃcial BitTorrent
and renewed Napster services, are designed for distributing content on legal basis.
However, there is a signiﬁcant number of P2P networks which do not have any
concern and mechanism for enforcing copyright. As a matter of fact, users of
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these systems can abuse P2P network services to share pirated content illegally.
Since our solutions are based on decentralized and unstructured (pure) P2P net-
works, below we discuss their properties and mechanisms in detail.
2.1.1 Pure P2P Networks
In designing our solutions, we focus on pure P2P networks like Gnutella, be-
cause of their popularity and well-known open protocols [18]. Below, some of the
distinct properties of pure P2P networks are summarized [1, 31, 88].
• There is no central coordination or central database.
• No peer has a global view of the system.
• Global behavior emerges from local interactions.
• All existing data and services should be accessible.
• Peers are autonomous and anonymous.
• Peers and connections are unreliable.
Some of these features enable pure P2P networks to be very successful, but some
of them bring important problems. Among the problems of such networks is the
so-called reputation problem. In a pure P2P network peers interact with unknown
peers and have no information about their reputations. In other words, they do
not know to what extent they can trust the other peers and the data provided
by them. As a result, the detection of free rider peers and actions against them
can not be easily implemented.
2.1.2 Phases in P2P communication
In a pure P2P network, a peer may go through four main phases which are
implemented with descriptors in Gnutella Protocol [18] (See Table 2.2).
• Connection phase: A peer ﬁrst ﬁnds some peers (from its cache, a central
server, etc.) which have already connected to the P2P network. Then,
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it requests connections from these peers by sending Ping messages. After
receiving Pong messages, the peer sets up connections with these peers.
Then, the peer can begin to communicate with the other peers in the P2P
network.
• Search Phase: When a peer needs a ﬁle, it initiates the request by broad-
casting the Query message to the P2P network through its neighbors. To
limit the broadcasting of a Query message, Time-To-Live (TTL) value is
included in the message header. The querying peer sets up TTL value to
the maximum value deﬁned by the P2P protocol.
• Downloading Phase: If the peer receives a QueryHit message, it begins to
download the ﬁle from the source peer via a direct connection.
• Local Search and Routing Phase: Upon receiving a Query message via a
neighbor, the peer ﬁrst checks its local resources. If it has the ﬁle it returns
a QueryHit message to the neighbor. No matter whether it has the ﬁle or
not, it decreases the (TTL) value of the Query message by one. If the TTL
value is greater than 1, the peer forwards the Query message to all neighbors
other than the one which has delivered the search. If any QueryHit message
arrives, the peer routes it back to the requesting neighbor.
A two-tiered P2P structure which divides peers into two groups (ultrapeers -or
superpeers- and leaf peers) has also been proposed. Leaf nodes are located at
the “edge” of the network and they are not responsible for any routing. The
leaves are connected to the overlay through a few ultrapeers. On the other hand,
the nodes which have high-bandwidth and are not behind ﬁrewalls are selected
as ultrapeers. Ultrapeers accept leaf connections and route their queries. This
approach reduces the number of messages forwarded towards leaf peers which in
turn increases the scalability of the network. In this dissertation we focus on the
ﬂat pure P2P networks.
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Descriptor Description Content
Ping Used to actively discover hosts on Nothing
the network. A servent receiving a Ping
descriptor is expected to respond
with one or more Pong descriptors.
Pong The response to a Ping. Includes the IP and port of responding
address of a connected Gnutella servent host, number and
and information regarding the amount of size of ﬁles shared
data it is making available to the
network.
Query The primary mechanism for searching Minimum speed
the distributed network. A servent requirement of the
receiving a Query descriptor will responding host;
respond with a QueryHit if a match is search string
found against its local data set.
QueryHit The response to a Query. This descriptor IP and port, speed of
provides the recipient with enough responding host;
information to acquire the data number of matching ﬁles and
matching the corresponding Query. their indexed result set
Push A mechanism that allows a ﬁrewalled Responding host id;
servent to contribute ﬁle-based data ﬁle index;IP and
to the network. port of requesting peer
Table 2.2: Gnutella Protocol Descriptors
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2.2 Free Riding Problem in P2P Networks
The free riding problem is actually not unique to P2P systems. In the economics
literature, the tragedy of the commons [47] is a similar problem with the free
riding issue in P2P networks. The tragedy of the commons states the fact that
selﬁsh consumption of public goods may exhaust the whole public value. In this
context, a public good can be deﬁned as “a commodity for which use of a unit of
the good by one user does not prevent its use by other users”. Due to insuﬃcient
motivations to control individual behavior, people excessively consumes public
goods, which leads to the tragedy of the commons problem. Over-ﬁshing in deep
oceans, pollution in cities, and over use of pesticides can be given as common
examples of this problem.
In P2P networks, we can consider the services and digital objects as common
goods because, for example, downloading a ﬁle does not prevent other peers from
using it. As a P2P concept, free riding means exploiting P2P network resources
(through searching, downloading objects, or using services) without contributing
to the P2P network. A free rider is a peer that uses the P2P network services
but does not contribute to the network at an acceptable level. A contributor, on
the other hand, is a peer that contributes to the network by sharing its resources
with other peers.
Various aspects of P2P networks have been investigated by many researchers.
Some of the works on P2P networks have examined in detail the scalability,
reliability, and workload issues [15, 39, 54]. Some researchers have analyzed
the traﬃc and topology dynamics [39, 40, 84], while others have studied ﬁle
popularity and availability in P2P networks [8, 17, 70, 94]. None of the works
mentioned above, however, consider the free riding problem, its causes, or free
rider demographics. The ﬁrst study which speciﬁcally addressed the free riding
problem in P2P networks was performed by Adar and Huberman [3].
Adar and Huberman extensively analyzed the peer traﬃc on the Gnutella network
and they observed that 70% of peers do not share any ﬁles at all. Furthermore,
63% of the peers who share some ﬁles do not get any queries for these ﬁles.
Another interesting observation is that 25% of the peers provide 99% of the all
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query hits in the network. Having observed the existence of high degrees of free
riding in P2P networks, the authors argue that free riding is an important threat
against the existence and eﬃcient operation of P2P networks.
Saroiu et al. conﬁrmed that there is a lot of free riding in Gnutella as well
as in Napster [92, 93]. They observed that 7% of the peers provide more ﬁles
than all of the other peers combined. Moreover, Saroiu et al. compared the
connection bandwidth reported by peers with the bandwidth calculated by direct
observation, and found out that many peers misreport their bandwidth.
In a recent work [48] Hughes et al. pointed to an increasing downgrade in the
network’s overall performance due to free riding. Their results indicated an in-
creasing level of free riding compared to Adar and Huberman’s work. For exam-
ple, they observed that 85 percent of peers share no ﬁles at all. They concluded
that free riding is becoming more prevalent. The other ﬁndings of that work
conﬁrmed Adar and Huberman’s overall ﬁndings. For example, they found that
the top 25 percent of peers provide 98 percent of all query hits.
In another work, Yang et al. reported their ﬁndings about free riding in the Maze
P2P system [101]. They also found a high level of free riding (about 80% of the
peers). They observed that free riders were responsible for 51% of downloads,
but for only 7.5% of uploads. These statistics suggest the existence of free riding
in spite of the incentive mechanism provided by the Maze P2P system.
Recently, Handurukande et al. observed free riding in the eDonkey P2P net-
work [46]. According to their ﬁndings approximatively 80% of the clients are free
riders. Like the other research results mentioned above, most of the remaining
clients share a small number of ﬁles. Less than 10% of the peers who are not
free riders share considerable amount of ﬁles. As the authors concluded, the free
riding phenomenon is common to most peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing systems, and the
eDonkey P2P network is no exception.
It has been almost taken for granted that free riding is an unwelcome behavior
and an important threat against the existence of P2P networks since the ﬁrst
observation. However, P2P networks succeed to survive in practice. Among
possible reasons for this fact, altruism is of key importance. There are usually
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altruistic peers in a P2P network, which can provide the required services, and
the existence of them may enable P2P networks to survive despite free riders
that exhibit selﬁsh behavior [29]. The sense of being a member of a community,
servicing other members, and gaining prestige among the others can be the mo-
tives for behaving altruistically [37, 53]. For example, SETI@home users share
their computation power and bandwidth to detect intelligent life outside Earth
without having a direct beneﬁt. Other than altruism, peers can continue to share
their resources by expecting that sharing resources helps to decrease the traﬃc at
other peers from which they request some service [62]. Security concerns can be
another important motive for some peers to stay obedient to P2P protocols. For
instance, peers may still use an original client program that disables free riding
instead of using a malicious version which enables free riding.
Even though generosity and altruism can play an important role in keeping on
peer contribution in some P2P networks, not all P2P networks can depend solely
on volunteer cooperation to achieve and maintain the desired level of service. In
the absence of external motives, the amount and impact of free riding can exceed
the acceptable levels depending on the requirements of diﬀerent P2P networks. By
employing free riding solutions, peers can be encouraged to contribute, negative
eﬀect of free riding can be diminished, and as a result, the aggregate utility of
the network can be improved [62]. Therefore, eliminating or reducing the impact
of free riding on P2P networks has become an important issue to investigate, and
a considerable amount of research has been devoted to it.
2.2.1 Causes of Free Riding
There may be various possible reasons and motivations for free riding in P2P
networks.
• Sharing resources is actually not free and may cost sharing peers in terms
of bandwidth, hard-disk space, CPU cycles, etc. Therefore, a peer may
want to avoid these costs by not sharing. For example, a peer may want to
avoid the bandwidth cost of uploading. Many ISPs provide asymmetric con-
nections which have relatively low uploading bandwidth. Therefore, peer’s
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bandwidth limitation and the network connections motivate free riding.
• If peers cooperation incurs some cost to themselves, and if the existing P2P
protocol does not diﬀerentiate between free-riders and contributors, then
peers do not have strong incentives to share. Since peers do not beneﬁt
from serving others, many peers decline to perform this altruistic act and
become free-riders.
• Most of the P2P protocols are designed as if each peer were volunteered to
cooperate and each peer contributes to the system equally, and thus they
lack incentives and/or enforcements for sharing. Therefore, all peers enjoy
the equal and same services even though some of them do not obey the
expectations. If peers can use the P2P system and its resources for free
and if they are not required to pay or to provide content in exchange of the
service they get, then they may not be concerned about contributing to the
system.
• Another reason for free riding can be the peers’ concern of sharing copyright-
infringing content from their own computers even though they are not con-
cerned about using this type of content.
• Furthermore, some peers with a Network Address Translation (NAT) ad-
dress act as a free rider even they do not intend to. Because, multiple
computers share the same domain of IPs through NAT, and, if both peers
are using NAT-based IP, they cannot download ﬁles from each other. These
peers cannot upload ﬁles and therefore they would become free riders even
they share ﬁles.
2.2.2 Impact of Free Riding
Free riding has some serious negative side eﬀects on P2P networks as summarized
in Table 2.3. In a free riding environment, a small number of peers serve a
large population. Therefore, many download requests are directed towards a few
serving peers, which may lead to scalability problems [82]. This also leads to a
more client-server like paradigm [84, 92] and negates many advantages of the P2P
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network structure. For example, the fault-tolerant properties of P2P networks
may be weakened because a very small portion of the peers provides most of the
content1. Renewal or presentation of interesting content may decrease in time;
thus the number of shared ﬁles may become limited or may grow very slowly.
The quality of searches process may degrade due to an increasing number of free
riders in the search horizon. As the peers age in the network, they may begin
not to ﬁnd interesting ﬁles and may leave the system for good with all the ﬁles
they shared earlier [39, 82]. Moreover, the large number of free riders and their
queries will generate a large amount of P2P network traﬃc, which may lead to
degradation of P2P services. Furthermore, underlying available network capacity
and resources will be occupied by free riders, which will cause extra delay and
congestion for non-P2P traﬃc as well.
Eﬀect Possible Consequences
A small number of peers serves Leads to more client-server like paradigm.
a large number of requests. Causes scalability problem.
Weakens fault tolerance property.
Renewal and presentation of Satisfaction level of peers will decrease.
new content may decrease Number of queries that will not receive
in time. any hit will increase.
Quality of search process Less number of hits will be returned.
may decrease. Satisfaction level of peers will decrease.
Peers may stop using the system.
Peer population may decrease.
Network traﬃc will increase. P2P services may degrade.
Delay, congestion, and loss will increase.
Table 2.3: Possible eﬀects and consequences of free riding on P2P networks.
How serious is the eﬀect of free riding on a P2P network depends on many factors
including the P2P network type and its requirements (see Table 2.3). Since some
resource types are not renewable, such as CPU cycles or disk space, it is very
important what portion of peers are free riders in a P2P network that share
those types of resources. For example, in P2P CPU-Sharing Grids, an example
of P2P distributed computing systems, without suﬃcient level of CPU resource
contribution, free riding can easily decrease the utility of the system or even can
11% of the peers provide 37% of the content [3].
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collapse the system [4]. Similarly, in P2P media streaming systems, peers gain
utility not only from the availability of ﬁles, but also from the ability to achieve
high quality streams of these ﬁles [42]. The quality of a streaming session depends
on a combination of factors, ranging from the characteristics of the streaming
sources to the characteristics of the network paths. While a conventional ﬁle
sharing system may be persistent with a low level of cooperation, a P2P streaming
system cannot oﬀer high streaming quality to its users if only a small portion of
users cooperate [42]. Even though the network is not heavily congested, if the
level of cooperation is low, the streaming quality would be poor [42]. Another type
of P2P application that is very vulnerable to free riding is P2P video multicasting
systems. In these networks, a piece of data (part of a video stream) arrives at
a receiver over multiple hops of intermediate relaying peers. If an intermediate
peer starts acting selﬁshly and refuses to relay data, the video stream will not
arrive at any node in the sub-tree rooted at that free riding peer. Hence all nodes
in that subtree of the multicast tree will not be able to receive the video stream.
This is a fatal error for this application [73].
Structured P2P networks can be more vulnerable to some sorts of free riding
than unstructured ones. In a structured P2P network that uses CAN (Content
Addressable Network) protocol [83], for example, peers are responsible to store
key-value pairs for keys that fall into their zone. A query in CAN is simply a
key in the key space and its result is the corresponding value. A peer replies a
query if the key is in its zone. Otherwise, it forwards the query to a neighbor.
In the context of CAN, peers can also free ride by not storing key-value pairs in
their zone and by ignoring incoming queries. This is a diﬀerent type of free riding
where a peer is not sharing an index either, not just the resource. If most of the
peers free ride in this manner, CAN may easily fall apart and it can not resolve
most of the queries [12].
The diﬀerence in P2P networks with regard to restrictions on sharing copyrighted
content illegally plays an important role in free riding considerations as well. Most
“illegal” content (pirated music, movies, books, etc.) sharing P2P applications do
not care about free riding at all, since good P2P network performance and high
user satisfaction are not that important for these networks. As the users of these
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networks share copyrighted materials for almost free, they can bear degraded
services. However, in “legal” content sharing, P2P applications care about their
performance and user satisfactions.
As a result, free riding aﬀects P2P networks in many ways and the level of impact
may vary depending on the type of the P2P network and the application require-
ments. The eﬀect may range from simply annoying the users to crashing the
whole system. Therefore, a solution designed and implemented to deal with the
free riding problem should be shaped according to the expected level of impact
of free riding.
2.3 Securing Free Riding Solutions
Free riding and security problems should be studied together because solutions
against free riding usually involve security mechanisms for protection from ma-
licious acts [13]. However, deploying security mechanisms in P2P networks is
quite diﬃcult due to the characteristics of P2P paradigm such as anonymity,
decentralization, self-organization and frequent disconnections [13].
Most security solutions used in networks of global scale require use of public keys
for authentication, shared secret establishment, or integrity checking, and hence
somehow depend on a public key infrastructure (PKI). Therefore we need to con-
sider how PKI can be eﬃciently integrated into a P2P network. PKI is needed by
asymmetric cryptography to establish the validity of the public keys. In asym-
metric cryptography, a user needs two keys: a private key that is known only
to the user, and a public key that is accessible to anyone. To authenticate the
validity of the public keys, PKI stores digital certiﬁcates that attach a public key
to the name of its owner by the digital signature of a trusted third party called
the Certiﬁcation Authority (CA). The management of certiﬁcates is a complex
duty that requests a substantial infrastructure, especially in large-scale applica-
tions [13]. The services provided by the PKI cover up the whole life cycle of the
certiﬁcates, including their issuance, distribution, suspension, and revocation.
In P2P context, direct implementation of PKI may be problematic. First of
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all, pure P2P networks do not have any central management, which makes the
standard PKI implementation based on CA hierarchy very diﬃcult. Even in P2P
networks with servers (hybrid or centralized), these servers usually do not fully
control the peer behaviors as much as servers can do in a conventional client-
server model. Thus, the centralized architecture of PKI may introduce several
important problems that contradict with the important characteristics of the
P2P networks [96]. One of the serious problems can be that the central servers
and services may easily turn out to be the bottleneck of system performance,
and thus the scalability of P2P network may become limited. For the network
management, the realization of PKI entails a remarkable amount of resources to
plan, install, deploy and maintain. For instance, PKI may need its own dedicated
servers to function eﬀectively. Furthermore, the huge number of users and high
turn-overs in P2P networks make key management a challenge by itself. All
these requirements hurt important characteristics of P2P paradigm by adding
complexity. Reminding that speciﬁcation document of the Gnutella protocol [18]
version 0.4 is only 10 pages including the appendices, the complexity introduced
by PKI would be understood better.
Another important issue of implementing security mechanisms is related with
anonymity of peers which is one of the beneﬁts of P2P networks provided to
its users. Anonymity is related with hiding who performed a given action [13].
Providing anonymity, however, can open the doors for various security threats and
malicious actions [96]. For instance, free riders can hide themselves or constantly
change their online identities by exploiting anonymity mechanisms. A solution
can be using a central trusted server, e.g., a CA, which can produce certiﬁcates for
peer identiﬁcation and supervise the validity of them. Rather than binding user
identity to an arbitrary user information (an e-mail address, user name, etc.),
these certiﬁcates can bind the identiﬁcation to a public key. In this solution,
new peers must connect to the CA before joining the network to get a certiﬁcate.
However, if peer identities (for example IP addresses) are revealed peer anonymity
is damaged to a certain extent. This means that user anonymity may be sacriﬁced
to some extent for the sake of security.
A relevant concept to anonymity is privacy. If one can control when, where, and
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how information about oneself is used and by whom, then it has the privacy [13].
To provide privacy, pseudonyms can be used to identify peers rather than their
real identiﬁers [13]. The other peers in the system should not be able to link
the pseudonym and the real identiﬁer of a peer. Thus, pseudonyms can be used
to refer to the subject that performed a given action without jeopardizing the
privacy of that subject. However, in some of P2P networks, peers usually do
not have a long-standing association with each other and with the network. As
a consequence, user authentication depending on long-term secret keys, like in
corporate networks [13], may not ﬁt well. Therefore, in practice, a simple but
less secure password-based user authentication has been extensively employed.
In summary, well-known client-server security solutions should be adapted for
P2P paradigm to have robust and secure free riding solutions that can function
in various P2P networks. Direct implementation of these solutions into P2P
networks, however, may not ﬁt the requirements and characteristics of P2P net-
works. In our solutions we do not require to use any kind of PKI implementations.
Thus our solutions are free from the issues regarding security infrastructure which
makes them practical and eﬃcient.
The proposed solutions in this dissertation do not require any kind of extra se-
curity infrastructure, and, thus, they do not cause any signiﬁcant overhead for
securing them in the existing P2P networks. The data structures used in the pro-
posed solutions are stored locally and there is no need to exchange information
(score, utility value, reputation, etc.) about other peers in the network. However,
malicious peer can still attack the solutions in various diﬀerent ways. We discuss
the possible attacks and how they can be dealt with in Chapter 6.
2.4 Approaches Proposed Against Free Riding
While cooperation is key to the existence and success of any P2P system, it is
diﬃcult to realize it without eﬀective mechanisms. In fact, most of the imple-
mented P2P systems lack such a mechanism and subsequently suﬀer from free
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riding. Only a small portion of existing P2P systems have some mechanisms im-
plemented against free riding, such as the ones described in [19, 26, 27, 71, 101].
To address this requirement, a number of approaches have been proposed
to make P2P networks “contribution-aware” in order to combat free riding
[5, 10, 12, 22, 25, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 58, 61, 62, 66, 69, 82, 95, 98, 102].
As the number of proposed solutions is quite large, we classiﬁed them into a
number categories to aid the presentation and reading. This classiﬁcation does
not consist of an exhaustive list of all published work and does not imply that
a single classiﬁcation is possible. We put the solutions that have similar charac-
teristics into the same category. There can be diﬀerent ways of classiﬁcation and
naming of the categories. We tried to stick to the terminology which is already
established in the literature.
The approaches proposed to deal with free riding problem can be categorized into
three main groups (see Figure 2.1):
• Micropayment-based Approaches: These methods have been proposed to
promote cooperation and discourage free riding within P2P networks by
implementing micropayments.
• Incentive-based Approaches: These methods have been suggested as non-
monetary mechanisms based on creating incentives for peers to share their
resources.
• Reputation-based Approaches: These methods have been designed to create
and distribute reputations of the peers by monitoring their past contribu-
tions.
2.4.1 Micropayment-based Approaches
In most of the P2P networks, the exchange of resources and services does not in-
volve any monetary transaction. By providing eﬃcient and secure pricing mecha-
nisms, micropayment approaches are based on pricing peers for the services they
get.
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Figure 2.1: A classiﬁcation of proposed solutions.
There are two key mechanisms in any micropayment system: an accounting mod-
ule to securely store the virtual currency held by each peer, and a settlement
module to fairly exchange virtual currency for services. The basic implementa-
tion of these components is to centralize their functions within a single central
authority (a trusted third-party, a central bank, a broker, or a group of peers).
This central authority manages each peer’s balance and transactions by tracking
accounts, distributing and cashing virtual currency. Most of the proposed solu-
tions depend on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for providing security against
frauds and errors. As we discussed in Section 2.3, PKI implementation in P2P
networks, however, has important issues. In essence, PKI has relatively heavy
components which pose an additional burden on a P2P network [13].
As micropayment solutions deal with payments of small amounts, the incorpo-
rated security mechanisms should be quite lightweight [100]. Otherwise, the
cost of the micropayment approach would overshadow the value of the payment.
Therefore, most micropayment solutions do not guarantee totally fair exchange
of goods and payment [100]. A tight security service would cause transactions to
be more expensive (in terms of computation and communications) than the value
of the exchanged goods. For example, in an oﬀ-line micropayment solution [100]
coin fraud (analogy with using a counterfeit coin in a vending machine) may not
be revealed until after the fact. However, oﬄine payments may be preferred from
a practical standpoint of performance improvements, such as lower latency, and
lower communication and computational costs. This example shows the necessity
of the question to what degree a network should be protected against malicious
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and selﬁsh peers. The reply to this question depends on the context of the net-
work deployment and on the scale of the risk. Excess of protection can be harmful
to the protection itself due to increasing complexity of the systems [13]. Eﬀective
micropayment systems simply require “good enough” security where fraud is de-
tectable, traceable and unproﬁtable, while preserving high eﬃciency. A malicious
peer should be avoided and disabled to continue using the services in the future.
Micropayment approaches are implemented using two diﬀerent payment methods:
online and oﬄine. In online payment methods, the exchange of virtual currency
takes place at the same time as the exchange of the services. This solution can
prevent most of the payment frauds. To apply this method, the central authority
must be reachable at the moment of transactions. On the other hand, in oﬄine
payment methods, the payment can be executed after the exchange of services if
the central authority is not available at the moment. However, in oﬄine payment
methods, there are several important restrictions on the proposed systems, such
as permanent identiﬁcations. Furthermore, because payments are oﬄine, coin
fraud (using a counterfeit coin) may not be discovered until after the fact. Still,
oﬄine payments might be preferred from a practical standpoint because they
cause lower latency, and lower communication and computational costs.
Various micropayment approaches have been proposed in the context of P2P
networks such as [35, 37, 44, 69, 71, 98, 100] among many others.
2.4.1.1 Implementation Issues
Micropayment-based approaches have several limitations when applied to P2P
networks.
• Centralization: All proposed solutions require some centralized authority
to monitor each peer’s balance and transactions. However, this require-
ment conﬂicts with P2P paradigm, which is, by its nature, highly dis-
tributed. Furthermore, there is no simple way to decentralize micropay-
ment approaches given that the central authority plays an important role
in them.
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• Scalability: Although payments could be online or oﬄine, eventually the
central authority must take some action for every transaction; as a result,
the central authority’s load is always directly proportional to the number
of peers and transactions. It is clear that when scalability is of primary
concern, a central authority constitutes both a bottleneck and a single point
of failure.
• Persistent identiﬁers: To store peer balances and manage transactions, mi-
cropayment approaches require persistent user identiﬁers. Providing persis-
tent identiﬁers, however, is complicated by the anonymity of peers, collec-
tions of widely dispersed peers, and the ease with which peers can modify
their online identity in most of the unstructured and decentralized P2P
networks.
• Mental transaction costs: Peers mostly dislike micropayments because of the
fact that they have to decide before each download if the service is worth
a few cents or not [44]. This leads to confusion and mental decision costs.
Thus, micropayment solutions involve peers’ mental eﬀort in exchange for
inexpensive resources, such as content, cycles, disk, etc.
• Communication overhead: There are two sources of communication over-
head caused by introducing micropayments. The ﬁrst overhead is created by
dissemination of virtual currency value announcements, transaction records,
etc. The second overhead is caused by the application of auditing mecha-
nisms for integrity checking and expenditure monitoring.
2.4.2 Incentive-Based Approaches
In incentive-based approaches, P2P protocols promote cooperation among peers
by providing some incentives. Service quality diﬀerentiation or prioritization
of peers are common methods used by incentive-based approaches. In general,
peers maintain histories of past behavior of other peers and use this information
in their service diﬀerentiation decision. These approaches can be based on direct
incentive (tit-for-tat) or indirect incentive (utility-based). In direct incentive
approaches, a peer decides how to serve another peer based solely on the direct
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service exchange between itself and this peer in the past. In contrast, in indirect
incentive approaches, the decision of the peer also depends on the service that
the other peer has provided not only to its neighbor but also to all peers in
the system. Direct incentive approaches are appropriate for the networks where
peers stay connected with long session durations, as they provide opportunities
for creating a fair and realistic history of reciprocity between pairs of peers.
Indirect incentive approaches are useful when the peer population is large and
the chance of direct interaction with the same peer is low. The indirect incentive
approaches provide faster information about a peer’s past activities compared to
direct incentive approaches.
Below, we provide more details about these two approaches.
2.4.2.1 Direct Incentive (Tit-for-Tat) Approaches
This kind of methods employs incentive mechanisms to encourage cooperative be-
havior between two or a set of peers. Each peer decides how to react to another
peer’s request depending on the past behavior of the other peer to its requests.
Some existing P2P applications have implemented Tit-for-Tat approaches. For
example, BitTorrent splits the original ﬁle into fragments [19]. To download all
the fragments of a ﬁle, peers are required to exchange already downloaded frag-
ments with the other downloading peers at the same time. In this way BitTorent
employs a Tit-for-Tat approach by enforcing exchange of fragment among down-
loading peers. Additionally, the protocol increases the download speed of a peer
if the peer provides more upload bandwidth.
The solutions that we propose in this dissertation implement a direct incentive
mechanism. The Detect and Punish Method (DPM) is based on the local inter-
action of peers to create a direct incentive mechanism. Each peer assigns ratings
to its neighbors based on the reaction of the neighbors to its service requests, and
those ratings determine the service quality oﬀered to the neighbors. In the P2P
Connection Management Protocol (PCMP), we propose exploiting P2P network
connection management as a direct incentive mechanism to promote contribution
by reconnecting the contributors to each other and pushing the free riders away
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from the contributors.
2.4.2.2 Indirect Incentive (Utility) based Approaches
These methods measure both a peer’s contribution to the network and its resource
consumption. This measure is termed the utility of the peer to the system which
governs each peer’s ability to consume network resources in the future. Utility-
based approaches create incentives by providing better network services to the
peers with higher utility. Peers with low utility value can face some form of
penalty. For instance, they cannot download ﬁles or cannot even submit search
requests if their utility value is less than the utility value of others or some
threshold value.
As an example for indirect incentive-based approaches, in [60], the EigenTrust
algorithm is used to measure a peer’s contribution level to the P2P network by
computing the peer’s uptime, and the number, popularity and diversity of its
shared ﬁles. The peers with high EigenTrust score are rewarded by better service
quality, such as faster download or increased view of the network. Other examples
of utility-based approaches against free riding include [42, 69].
2.4.2.3 Implementation Issues
There exist some critical issues to be considered regarding the realization of the
incentive-based approaches.
• Fake ﬁles: A peer can share some small ﬁles with fake ﬁlenames resembling
popular ﬁlenames. If these ﬁles are downloaded by others, this peer’s utility
value may increase.
• Credibility of the utility value: Some of the proposed incentive-based meth-
ods depend on accurate information about peers and this information is
provided or stored by the peers themselves. A P2P network depending on
such an approach can be cheated by writing malicious client programs.
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• Peer identity management: Peers are linked with their utility value through
their identities. However, a free rider can try to get rid of its reduced utility
by whitewashing, i.e., by constantly getting a new identity, if newcomers
are assigned a standard utility value which is higher than that of the free
rider. Whitewashing issue is discussed in Section 2.5.
2.4.3 Reputation-Based Approaches
The goal of reputation systems is to allow peers to avoid dealing with peers who
have bad reputations of being malicious or providing poor service in the past.
These systems use the interactions among peers to build up a good reputation
for contributing peers and a bad reputation for free riders.
In a reputation-based system, the information exchanged among peers can be pos-
itive reputations, negative reputations, or a combination of both. The systems
that distribute only positive reputations take only the successful transactions into
account to compute peer reputations. On the other hand, negative reputation-
based systems share only negative feedbacks or complaints about peers. As a
hybrid approach, a combination of positive and negative reputations can be dis-
seminated and used in the network to make the reputation mechanism more
accurate and reliable.
The reputation-based methods can be categorized into two main groups: au-
tonomous (local) reputation approaches, in which peers use only their own expe-
riences (local information), and global reputation approaches, in which peers use
the experiences of other peers (global information) in evaluating peers.
2.4.3.1 Autonomous (Local) Reputation-Based Approaches
In an autonomous reputation scheme, a peer builds up local reputation informa-
tion about other peers with which it has interacted by itself. Therefore, each peer
can have diﬀerent reputation values for the same peer. Unlike global reputation
systems, autonomous reputation-based approaches do not aim to merge and dis-
tribute these local reputations to create a global consideration. As a result, they
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are relatively simple to implement, because they do not call for a security infras-
tructure or centralized storage in order to assure the integrity of local reputations
from other peers, unlike global reputation systems. Autonomous reputation ap-
proaches are used in some existing P2P networks such as eMule and GNUnet.
2.4.3.2 Global Reputation-Based Approaches
For a P2P network with a large peer population, any two peers may seldom or
never interact. Therefore, it can take a long time to observe enough interaction
between two peers to create useful reputations for their behavior toward each
other. Global reputation-based approaches employ a reputation mechanism which
depends not only on a peer’s local interactions but also on other peers’ interactions
by consolidating all peers’ local information. Various attacks can target at the
reliability and integrity of global reputation information. Despite the security
risks, global reputation approaches have the advantage of considerably speeding
up identifying free riders, as peers can learn from others’ interactions as well.
The reputation information can be distributed through the system in diﬀerent
ways. For example, in the XRep system [22], the reputation information that is
locally created is stored at each peer, whereas in EigenRep [58], in addition to
local reputation values stored at peers, the global reputation information derived
from multiple local values is also stored at random peers. A peer retrieves any
peer’s reputation information from the system by using a retrieval mechanism.
2.4.3.3 Implementation Issues
Below we discuss some important issues that need to be considered when imple-
menting reputation-based solutions.
• Reliability: Guaranteeing reliability and consistency of the reputation in-
formation gathered about peers is an important issue. There are a number
of proposals against malicious acts such as using a voting scheme to collect
opinions about a peer, implementing heuristics to ﬁnd groups of potentially
malicious voters, and applying a distributed cryptographic infrastructure
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to conﬁrm the identities of peers involved in a transaction.
• Communication overhead: In a global reputation system, peers need to
communicate with each other or a special group of peers to exchange and
consolidate reputation information, which increases P2P network traﬃc and
can lead to scalability problems.
• Complexity: In a global reputation system, the need for ensuring the relia-
bility of information received from other peers about their interactions with
third parties can be met by adding security mechanisms to P2P network
such as a cryptographic infrastructure like a PKI. A Certiﬁcation Authority
(CA) can be integrated into the P2P network to authenticate the reputation
information being shared. This type of infrastructure might suit better to
hybrid or centralized P2P networks, such as Napster or BitTorrent, than
pure P2P networks, such as Gnutella. As discussed in Section 2.3, the im-
plementation of PKI adds signiﬁcant complexity to P2P management by
entailing a remarkable amount of resources to plan, install, deploy, and
maintain. Furthermore, the huge number of users and high turnovers in
P2P networks make key management a complex issue.
• Peer identity management: Peers are linked with their reputations through
their identities. Free riders can try to get rid of their bad reputations
by constantly renewing their identities. Thus, P2P networks implementing
reputation-based approaches should deal with identity management as well.
• False recommendations: Most global reputation systems assume that peers
report their interactions with other peers honestly and impartially. How-
ever, a peer can cheat the system to beneﬁt more at the cost of the others
by misreporting the services received from other peers. If false recommen-
dations can not be ﬁltered out the fairness and eﬀectiveness of a reputation-
based approach will be jeopardized.
• Centralization: Global reputation systems may rely on a centralized au-
thority to store and manage reputation ratings. Therefore monitoring peer
reputations in a decentralized (pure) P2P network is problematic due to
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the lack of a central authority. Furthermore, the required central infras-
tructure costs may be unreasonably high compared to the existing P2P
infrastructure, and scalability of such a centralized system may be quite
limited. For instance, it is argued that trust management in P2P networks
does not scale well to many peers (i.e., when the number of peers is larger
than 100,000) [12].
2.5 Common Attacks or Cheats
Some free rider peers could try to work around the free riding mechanisms if
this would increase their beneﬁts from the system. Solutions provided to prevent
free riding should be robust enough against these kinds of attacks. Below we
list some of the common attacks that can be mounted against the free riding
solutions [10, 30, 44, 45, 58, 101]. These attacks are also summarized in Table 2.4.
• Collusion: A group of malicious peers can attempt to collectively challenge
and fool the free riding mechanisms. For instance, a group of peers can
collude to promote one or more peers in the group, or, to damage the
reputation of a victim in a global reputation system. As another example,
in some of the solutions against free riding, a peer can detect and announce
a misbehaving peer. To evade being detected, cheaters may exploit these
mechanisms by announcing an innocent peer or a potential announcer as a
cheater.
• Modifying virtual currency/utility/reputation value: A cheater may exagger-
ate its virtual currency, utility, or reputation value by providing incorrect
information about itself. Cheaters can do this by modifying client programs,
cracking locally saved values, and so on.
• Whitewashing: In most current P2P networks, it is cost-free for a peer
to join the network and obtain an online identity. This enables growing
the network rapidly, since newcomers can easily join the system [29]. On
the other hand, cheaters can use this fact to change their online identity
anytime, and thus have all the advantages and rights of a newcomer. This
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is called whitewashing. A free rider may choose to whitewash repeatedly to
avoid being detected and getting punished. Incentive and reputation-based
approaches are very prone to this kind of attack.
In many P2P networks, the real world identiﬁcation of a peer is not bound
to its online identity. Therefore, these systems can not easily locate a peer
who has more than one account in the system or who enters the system
repeatedly using a new identity each time. Distinguishing whitewashers
from legitimate newcomers is an important issue to stop or restrict the
cheaters.
A robust and long-term free riding solution should consider the possibility of these
attacks and should incorporate mechanisms that can successfully deal with these
kinds of attacks. For example, one technique that can be used against white-
washing is attaching a high cost to acquiring new identities for all newcomers
using proof of work (POW) protocols [52]. As another measure against white-
washing attack, the free riding solution may require use of free but irreplaceable
pseudonyms for peers through the assignment of strong identities by a trusted
central authority [29]. An irreplaceable pseudonym for a peer can be, for exam-
ple, the unique MAC (medium access control) address of the computer the peer
is using. It is better that we consider the possible attacks as early as possible
while designing a free riding solution, so that at the end we have a mechanism
that can eﬀectively deal with free riders and their workarounds.
Attack Type Description
Collusion A group of malicious peers arrange an attack
and report incorrect information or promote each other.
Modifying Values A cheater may exaggerate its virtual currency value.
Whitewashing Cheaters change their identities and connections
to erase their past records.
Table 2.4: Some common attacks to proposed solutions.
Chapter 3
Detect and Punish Method
In this chapter, we propose a new framework, the Detect and Punish Method
(DPM), which is a distributed and localized solution against free riding in un-
structured P2P networks. In DPM, peers’ contribution to the network is mon-
itored, and peers are enforced to act cooperatively in sharing network services
and resources. The goal of this framework is not to eliminate all possible kinds of
free riding. It is neither aimed to promote or enforce new content contribution by
peers, as this may not be feasible. The aim of our low-overhead framework is to
improve the current situation and reduce the ill-eﬀects of free riding by detecting
free riders, and reducing the amount of service they get from the network. In this
way, peers are enforced to cooperate in order to use the services provided by a
P2P network.
The beneﬁts of DPM over the other mechanisms against free riding that have
appeared in the literature can be summarized as below.
• In our work, we do not propose to use any scoring value for a peer’s utility
to the system. Thus, we do not need to bother with storing, retrieving,
and saving a utility value. Each peer just stores information about the
neighbors’ messages which are routed through it.
• Unlike the other proposals against free riding, DPM does not require any
permanent identiﬁcation of peers or security infrastructures for maintaining
a global reputation system.
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• DPM does not require explicit cooperation of any group of peers to make
the system work. Each peer executes the same kind of mechanisms alone
and does not depend on any other peer’s cooperation.
• As opposed to many solutions that execute the counter-actions at the down-
load request phase, our solution executes some counter-actions at the query
forwarding phase, i.e., during the search operation. In this way, our solu-
tion reduces not only the downloads performed by free riders, but also the
query messages ﬂowing in the network due to free riders. This considerably
reduces the network traﬃc overhead.
• DPM requires minimal changes to the current protocol processing rules and
it does not require any architecture changes.
• Both the detection mechanism and counter-actions are simple, practical and
eﬀective. Nor do they use large amount of resources.
• DPM categorizes the free riders into several categories. This enables us to
apply several diﬀerent counter-actions that are tailored to the types of free
riding.
• DPM assesses the contribution of each individual neighbor to the monitoring
peer and the overall system, on contrary to some other approaches which
evaluate the contribution of the sub-network reachable via each neighbor.
In the following sections, we present the details about DPM, more speciﬁcally,
the approach, the detection mechanism, the proposed free riding types, and the
counter actions.
3.1 Main Approach
Our approach against free riding requires every peer to passively monitor its
neighbors. Two roles are deﬁned for each peer: monitoring and being controlled
(see Figure 3.1). A peer takes both roles at the same time. As a monitoring peer,
a peer monitors and records the number of messages coming from and going
towards its neighbors (i.e., keeps some statistical information). The neighbors
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Figure 3.1: Peers are in two roles: monitoring and controlled.
are controlled peers. At the same time, the peer is also a controlled peer, which
implies that its messages are monitored and recorded by its neighboring peers.
By monitoring the messages of its neighbors, a monitoring peer can decide if a
neighbor is acting like a free rider. Upon deciding that the neighbor is acting as a
free rider, the monitoring peer can take counter-measures against that neighbor
to reduce the adverse eﬀects of free riding.
The statistical information1 that a monitoring peer maintains about a controlled
peer P consists of a set of counters that are shown in Table 3.1. These counters
are maintained and updated by the monitoring peer as follows.
• QRP , the number of Query messages routed by peer P , is incremented
whenever the monitoring peer receive a Query message from peer P in which
the TTL value is less than the ﬁxed max TTL. The Queries originating from
peer p are not counted; only the Queries originated at somewhere else and
routed by peer P are counted. The monitoring peer decides if the Query
originated by the neighbor or not by looking to the TTL value. If the
neighbor P has originated the Query, then the Query message would have
a TTL value equal to the ﬁxed max TTL.
• QTP , the number of Query messages routed towards peer P , is incremented
whenever the monitoring peer sends a Query message to the neighbor P .
Both the Query messages originated at the monitoring peer and the Query
messages just forwarded by the monitoring peer are counted.
1Due to the power-law distribution of node degrees observed in P2P networks [55], we expect
the average number of neighbors of a peer to be around 3-4, and therefore the overhead imposed
by the solution on each peer will not be very large. Even the number of neighbors is larger
than the average, the space and processing requirements are very low. This implies that the
framework is scalable, thanks to its distributed nature.
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Symbol Description
QRP Number of Query messages routed by peer P .
QTP Number of Query messages routed towards peer P .
QHP Number of QueryHit messages submitted by peer P .
QHRP Number of QueryHit messages routed by peer P .
QHSP Number of QueryHit messages satisfying queries of peer P .
Table 3.1: Observed Descriptors.
• QHP , the number of QueryHit messages submitted by peer P , is incre-
mented whenever the monitoring peer receives a QueryHit message from
peer P . The message must be originated (not forwarded) by peer P . The
monitoring peer can decide this by checking the IP address ﬁeld of the
message, which stores the IP address of the originator of the message.
• QHRP , the number of QueryHit messages routed by peer P , is incre-
mented whenever the monitoring peer receives a QueryHit message from
peer P in which the IP Address ﬁeld in the message contains an IP address
diﬀerent than that of peer P .
• QHSP , the number of QueryHit messages satisfying queries of peer P ,
is incremented whenever a Query message formerly submitted by peer P
receives a QueryHit. To observe this, whenever a monitoring peer receives
a Query message whose TTL is the ﬁxed max TTL, it records in its internal
table (using the message ID of the Querymessage) that the Query originated
from the neighbor P . Then, after receiving a QueryHit message with the
same message ID, the monitoring peer decides that the QueryHit message
is for that controlled neighbor and increments the counter QHSP . The
monitoring peer counts only once for all the QueryHit messages received
for the same query.
The values of these counters indicate both whether the neighbor is a free rider
and the type of free riding. A diﬀerent set of counters is maintained for each
neighbor. The details of how we employ these counters are explained in the
following sections.
We need to consider the issue of whether there is enough time during a typical
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monitoring process to collect suﬃcient information about the neighbors to make
correct decisions about their behavior. In one study [84], about 40% of peers in a
Gnutella network leave the network in less than 4 hours; only 25% of the peers are
alive for more than 24 hours. In another work [92], the average session duration
of both Napster and Gnutella network clients is reported to be about 60 minutes.
A similar work [39] found that 90% of Kazaa clients have sessions averaging 30
minutes in length. All these studies show that most peers in a P2P network
stay connected long enough for monitoring peers to collect enough information
to make correct decisions.
Another issue is whether a monitoring peer can monitor enough messages. In
one study [70], the average number of queries received per second for three peers
located at three diﬀerent locations is about 50. In that same study, each peer
received or sent an average of 30 query responses per second and the query re-
sponse ratio per peer is around 10%-12%. This study shows that a monitoring
peer will have enough messages forwarded through itself to or from a neighbor to
judge if the neighbor is a free rider.
3.2 Free Riding Types and Detecting Free Rid-
ers
Previous works on free riding [4, 5, 37, 59, 98] have generally assumed that only
one type of free riding is exhibited in a P2P network. However, studies [3, 39, 70,
82, 92] on P2P network traﬃc and user behavior suggest that not all free riders
behave the same. Therefore, in this thesis we deﬁne three types of free riding
(non-contributor, consumer, dropper) with diﬀerent properties as summarized in
Table 3.2. The types of free riding that we deﬁne here are not exhaustive. It
is possible to deﬁne new types of free riding with diﬀerent properties [61]. We
believe that three types are suﬃcient for developing a general framework, and
these free riding types that we focus on in this dissertation constitute a large
fraction of all free riders. A detailed description of each type is given below.
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Free Riding Type NONE NON-CONTR. CONSUMER DROPPER
Sharing Content? Yes, much No Yes, but little No
Replicating Content? Yes No No No
Routing Messages? Yes Yes Yes No
Request Gen. Rate Normal Normal Higher Normal
Table 3.2: Summary of free riding types and their properties.
3.2.1 Non-contributor
If a peer does not share anything at all or shares uninteresting ﬁles, it is identiﬁed
as a non-contributor. A controlled peer P exhibiting this type of free riding can
be detected by a monitoring peer who counts the QueryHit messages (QHP ) orig-
inating from the neighbor and compares them to the number of Query messages
(QTP ) sent to the neighbor (Table 3.1)
2.
If the number of QueryHit messages received is very few compared to the number
of Querymessages sent, then the neighbor is identiﬁed as a non-contributor. More
precisely, if the ratio (QHP/QTP ) is below a threshold value, then the peer is
identiﬁed as a non-contributor.
Not receiving (or receiving very few) QueryHit messages from a neighbor may
indicate that the neighbor is either not sharing any ﬁles at all, or is sharing
ﬁles that are not interesting and therefore they do not match the search queries.
Unfortunately, a method like this, which is based on counting the QueryHit mes-
sages, cannot distinguish between these two types of reasons of not responding 3.
Diﬀerent approaches for setting up a threshold value can be used 4. Whatever the
2We can identify the source of a QueryHit message by looking at the IP Address ﬁeld in
the message, which stores the IP address of the responder.
3Peers who are cooperative but share unpopular ﬁles would be aﬀected by false positives.
From the perspective of the performance measures we have investigated, it seems that punishing
such kind of users has a small impact on the overall performance of the network. A bias
against these peers is one unintended consequence of emphasizing performance in an incentive
mechanism. We acknowledge that the solution of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4We may, for example, set up a ﬁxed value (say 100) for unsatisﬁed query number as a
threshold. In this case, if QTP −QHP is greater than this threshold, the neighbor is identiﬁed
as non-contributor. As another approach, we may use a time-based threshold, such as 10
minutes, during which we monitor for QueryHit messages from the neighbor. If there is no
QueryHit message received from the neighbor during this time period, the peer can be treated
as a non-contributor.
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approach, however, the proposed framework enables a monitoring peer to judge if
a neighbor is a non-contributor just by observing the neighbor’s existing protocol
messages, without requiring that any new control message be deﬁned for detection
of free riders. Below, we formulate our method to detect non-contributors as a
condition that is evaluated whenever an update is performed on the values of the
respective counters. We have used this formula in our simulation experiments.
if (QTP > τQT ) and (
QHP
QTP
< τnon contributor) then
peer P is considered as a non-contributor
endif
To eliminate the warm-up period and to obtain valid statistical information we
propose using a threshold value, τQT , for the number of forwarded Querymessages
to the controlled peer. A monitoring peer starts making a decision about the
controlled peer after this threshold is exceeded.
3.2.2 Consumer
Peers may contribute some content to the network. They are not therefore non-
contributors, but the services they use may greatly exceed their contribution.
This is not a desirable behavior in terms of the long term stability of the P2P
network and fairness to other peers.
To identify whether a controlled peer P is a consumer, a monitoring peer counts
the QueryHitmessages that originate from the neighbor (QHP ) and the QueryHit
messages that are destined to the neighbor (QHSP ). By comparing the ratio of
these two values against a threshold value τconsumer, the monitoring peer can
decide if the neighbor is a consumer or not.
In identifying consumers, the number of actual downloads, instead of QHSP ,
could have been used. However, in unstructured P2P networks, the download
process is executed directly between two peers [18]. Therefore, the intermediate
nodes are not aware of the download process. This means that, the monitoring
peers are not able to use actual download numbers to identify the consumers.
Therefore, we propose using the QueryHit messages as an indication of possible
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downloads. We assume that if a query gets one or more QueryHits, the owner of
the query would download at least one copy of the requested ﬁle 5.
The following condition is checked to decide if a neighbor is a consumer or not
whenever a respective counter maintained for the neighbor and used in the for-
mula is modiﬁed. Again threshold for QTP counter is used to eliminate the
warm-up period before starting making decision about the behavior of a neigh-
bor.
if (QTP > τQT ) and (
QHP
QHSP
< τconsumer) then
peer P is considered as a consumer
endif
3.2.3 Dropper
A peer is identiﬁed as a dropper if the peer drops others’ queries. Some peers
might not forward protocol messages (Query, QueryHit, etc.) in order to save
their connection bandwidth.
In order to detect a dropper peer P , a monitoring peer can count Query (QRP )
and QueryHit messages (QHRP ) forwarded by this neighbor. If the sum of these
two values is very low compared to the number of Query messages sent toward
the neighbor (QTP ), it can be assumed that either the neighbor does not have
enough connections (to receive Query or QueryHit messages and forward them),
or it drops Query and/or QueryHit messages. Again we can use a threshold value,
τdropper, for the ratio.
if (QTP > τQT ) and (
QRP+QHRP
QTP
< τdropper) then
peer P is considered as a dropper
endif
5We only count once for all the QueryHit messages received for the same query. All
QueryHits that is received for the same Query message will have the same unique message
ID value.
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3.3 Counter-Actions Against Free Riders
When a peer identiﬁes a controlled peer as a free rider, the peer can start taking
some actions against it. Here, we will focus on some sample counter-actions that
can be implemented simply by modifying the existing P2P protocols.
Before discussing the details of counter actions, we would like to explain the
relation between detection and counter acting. The detection of free riding and
its type is determined according to the values of statistical counters maintained for
a neighbor in the log table of a monitoring peer. When the values of the counters
change, it may indicate that the type of free riding practiced by the neighbor
has changed. For example, if the (QHP/QTP ) ratio for a neighbor P is smaller
than the respective threshold (i.e., the neighbor is a non-contributor), and later
becomes greater than that threshold, the neighbor is no longer a non-contributor.
Thus, monitoring peer would stop applying counter-action to the controlled peer
since it is no longer a non-contributor. In essence, the counter-actions to peers
are dynamic and changed according to the detection mechanism.
Our counter-actions are based on ignoring Query messages submitted by free
riders or reducing the scope of these queries. In this way we reduce the amount
of service that free riders get from the network. There are two main services
that a peer can get from a P2P network: 1) searching for ﬁles by issuing Query
messages; 2) downloading ﬁles after getting answers to the queries. If we reduce
the amount of searching service that a free rider gets, we also cause a reduction
in the amount of downloading service that it gets. Therefore, our counter-actions
aim to reduce the propagation of Query messages submitted by free riders; then
the free riders will have less chance of getting QueryHitmessages and will perform
fewer downloads.
We propose two types of counter-action schemes: 1) single counter-action
schemes, and 2) mixed counter-action schemes. A single counter-action applies
the same action to all types of free riders. A mixed counter-action scheme applies
a diﬀerent counter-action for each type of free riding.
The proposed single counter-actions are described in more detail below.
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3.3.1 Modifying TTL Value
When a peer receives a Query message from a controlled peer, it ﬁrst executes
a search on local ﬁles for a match, and then forwards the Query to its other
neighbors. Before the Query message is forwarded, its TTL value is normally
decreased by one. However, the monitoring peer can play with this TTL value,
i.e., the monitoring peer can decrement the TTL value by more than one before
forwarding it further. In this way, the search horizon of the free-riding peer is
narrowed. This also reduces the overhead imposed by Query messages on the
network. To observe the eﬀect of this counter-action at a ﬁner granularity for
diﬀerent values of TTL reduction, we propose to employ two diﬀerent values, i.e.,
2 and 4, for decreasing TTL6. We call the corresponding counter-actions TTL-2
and TTL-4, respectively.
3.3.2 Dropping Requests
As a sharper counter-action, the monitoring peer can simply ignore all the search
requests coming from a neighbor identiﬁed as a free rider. Dropping a Query
message means not searching the local ﬁles for a match and not forwarding the
Query any further; this is totally diﬀerent from what happens in the Modifying
TTL counter-action. We call this counter-action DROP.
Dropping the search requests of free riders or narrowing down their search hori-
zon by modifying TTL not only punishes the free riders, but it also signiﬁcantly
decreases the overhead of P2P control messages over the underlying infrastruc-
ture. Uncontrolled query messages in a ﬂooding-based P2P network can become
a signiﬁcant portion of overall network traﬃc7. We believe that decreasing the
6Actually, we implemented and observed the eﬀects of diﬀerent values between 2 and 6 in the
simulation experiments. The results are provided in Section 6.1.4. We observed that TTL-2 has
the least improvement eﬀect on the performance and, TTL-6 and TTL-5 yield similar results
to those of the DROP counter-action. TTL-4 produces a mid-point between them. Therefore,
to give some insight about the eﬀect of the Modifying TTL Action with diﬀerent reduction
amounts on the system performance, we select TTL-2 and TTL-4 as representative values in
this thesis.
7For example, as it is pointed out in [85], 18 bytes of search string in a Query message
may cause 90 megabytes of data to be forwarded by the peers of a P2P network. As another
example, [2] states that the total number of messages including the responses triggered by a
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number of queries submitted by free riders may help improve the performance
and scalability of both P2P networks and the underlying Internet.
3.3.3 A Mixed Counter-Action
A monitoring peer that would like to execute a mixed counter-action scheme can
apply an appropriate counter-action depending on the type of free riding. As
mentioned earlier, a free-riding peer can be either a non-contributor, a dropper,
or a consumer. Thus, a possible mixed counter-action scheme may dictate that
counter-action TTL-2 is applied if the free rider is a consumer, counter-action
TTL-4 is applied if the free rider is a non-contributor, and counter-action DROP
is applied if the free rider is a dropper. In these settings, we aim to apply more
severe counter-actions to free riding types that will cause more severe damage to
the P2P network. A neighbor that is not identiﬁed as a free rider will not invite
any counter-action.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present the details of DPM by explaining the main approach,
the proposed free riding types, the detection mechanism, and the counter actions.
As a summary, DPM requires each peer to monitor the network traﬃc of its
neighbors. By monitoring the messages of its neighbors, a peer can decide if a
neighbor is acting like a free rider. If a peer determines that a neighbor is acting
as a free rider, the peer can take counter-measures against that neighbor to reduce
the adverse eﬀects of free riding.
To evaluate DPM in a P2P network environment, we have conducted extensive
simulation tests. In Chapter 6, we present and discuss the simulation results of
the proposed solution in detail.
single Query message can be as large as 26240 (assuming 4 connections per peer).
Chapter 4
A New P2P Connection
Management Protocol
Our second solution in this thesis, called P2P Connection Management Protocol
(PCMP), is a connection-time solution that can be used to deal with free rid-
ing at connection establishment time. In this way it is quite diﬀerent from the
other methods that have appeared in the literature. PCMP is based on manag-
ing connections among peers to discourage free riding and to provide incentives
for cooperation. PCMP involves the use of a novel connection type, One-Way-
Request Connection (OWRC), and a P2P connection management protocol that
dynamically establishes the connections between peers, and it adaptively mod-
iﬁes the P2P topology in reaction to the contributions of peers. Our claim is
that if we can adjust the P2P network topology dynamically in reaction to peers’
contributions, the adapted topology can favor the contributing peers in getting
service from the P2P network. The adapted topology can also exclude the free
riders from the P2P network, and thus the adverse eﬀects of free riding can be
reduced as well. Furthermore, it helps a P2P network to become more scalable
and robust.
There exist some other studies which also focus on modifying P2P topology in-
cluding the ones presented in [14, 16, 20, 67, 91]. However, they do not attack
the free riding problem directly. These works basically aim either to solve the
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topology mismatching problem for improving the search quality, or to modify the
topology for decreasing overhead and increasing performance.
The boot-up and connection management mechanism in unstructured P2P net-
works allows a peer to join and leave a P2P network randomly, which causes
topology mismatching between the P2P logical overlay network and the physical
underlying network. The topology mismatching issue can cause a great amount
of unnecessary congestion in the Internet infrastructure and seriously restrict the
performance gain from various search or routing techniques. In [67], Liu et al.
proposed a method called the Adaptive Overlay Topology Optimization (AOTO)
to optimize ineﬃcient overlay topologies for improving P2P search and routing
eﬃciency. In another work [20], Crameret et al. also aimed to create a topol-
ogy reﬁnement by modifying the bootstrapping mechanism in the P2P network.
Bootstrapping is an important core functionality required by every P2P overlay
network. Peers intending to participate in such an overlay network initially have
to ﬁnd at least one other peer that is already connected to the network. The
main idea of their approach is to use IP addresses to connect physically nearby
peers together. For this, the proposed solution requires a peer that is part of
the network to publish a reasonable (arbitrary k-bit) preﬁx of its IP address into
a DHT (distributed hash table) directory. Then, a newly joining peer consults
to this directory to ﬁnd some physically close peers. In this way, peers try to
establish connections with other peers that are physically close.
In [91], Singh and Haahr proposed to modify the P2P network topology so that
peers with similar properties (bandwidth, geographic location, amount or type
of shared resources, etc.) become close to each other. Similarly, in [14], Cai and
Wang proposed a two-layer (neighbors and friends) unstructured P2P system for
better keyword searches. The neighbors overlay is created according to network
proximity while the friends overlay is built according to the online query activities.
In order to increase the search quality, they try to avoid the free riders in the
system while routing the queries. Primarily, the friends overlay is used to route
the queries. Because, the friends overlay is constructed in such a way that free
riders can not be friends of any peer. Thus the query would avoid free riders
at the ﬁrst place. In our proposal, we implement only a single overlay network
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and our aim is to stop query submissions of free riders as well. However, in their
system any peer, including free riders, may issue queries to the system which
allows free riders to use the network resources. Actually, unlike our protocol,
their proposal is not designed speciﬁcally against free riders. Chawathe et al.
focused on scalability problem in unstructured P2P networks and applied dynamic
topology adaptation [16]. They speciﬁcally aimed to match the query capacity of
the peers with the routed queries to avoid the peers become overloaded by high
query rates.
The properties of PCMP and its diﬀerences from the related previous works in
the literature can be summarized as below.
• In our work, we do not propose to use any scoring value for a peer’s utility
to the system. Thus, we do not need bother with storing, retrieving, and
saving a utility value.
• Unlike other proposals against free riding, PCMP does not require any
permanent identiﬁcation of peers or security infrastructures for maintaining
a global reputation system.
• PCMP does not require the explicit cooperation of any group of peers to
make the system work. Each peer executes the same kind of mechanisms
alone and does not depend on any other peer’s cooperation.
• PCMP is a dynamic approach. The connections are updated and changed
dynamically depending on the interaction of peers.
• PCMP is autonomous. Each peer takes part in the connection management
protocol autonomously (i.e., accepts a connection request by itself). No
central management is required.
• PCMP depends on ﬁrst hand observations. Decisions about connections
are taken upon direct interaction with each peer. Therefore, the potential
attacks by malicious peers are limited.
• PCMP is a simple protocol. The proposed method is very simple to imple-
ment and has a very small overhead for peers.
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• The amount of change required to implement PCMP in the current un-
structured P2P networks is not much, so the proposal is practical.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst describe our main approach and highlight its
beneﬁts brieﬂy. We then give the details of our two new connection types and
the connection management protocol. We describe in detail how we establish and
manage the connections between contributors and free riders. We also provide
an example that shows how PCMP works and modiﬁes a topology for the beneﬁt
of contributing peers.
4.1 Main Approach
P2P network topology aﬀects the propagation of queries, the quality and quantity
of search results, and the overhead imposed on the underlying physical network.
Therefore, the connections among peers should be carefully controlled and man-
aged. However, in current pure P2P networks, peers can try to connect to any
other peer, and they can refuse any connection request to them. Each peer has
equal right to do so, independent of their contribution level. Moreover, each peer
can use all of its connections to send its queries. In our framework, we change
these two properties of pure P2P network protocols to create an incentive for
cooperation and to discourage free riding.
First, instead of a single connection type that exists in P2P networks to send
and receive queries, we deﬁne the One-Way-Request Connection (OWRC) which
introduces two new connection types: IN and OUT connections. IN connections
are only used to receive queries and to reply them (i.e., provide service). OUT
connections, on the other hand, are used just to send queries and to receive replies
(i.e., request service). By using two types of connections, we can now diﬀerentiate
and control service request and service provision separately.
Second, we propose a P2P Connection Management Protocol (PCMP) to estab-
lish and release these two types of connections. The protocol considers the peer
contributions while establishing and releasing connections. Hence free riders can
be disconnected from contributing peers and even get isolated sometimes. In
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this way, the associated problems with free riding can be alleviated. Moreover,
contributing peers may establish connections to not free riders, but to other con-
tributors and therefore the number of contributors in their search horizon can
be increased. Thus, contributors can have better chance to get query hits and
downloads.
We foreseen several beneﬁts of applying our protocol. The connectivity of free
riders to the contributing peers can be reduced; in some situations, free riders can
be totally isolated from the contributors. Furthermore, the connectivity among
contributor peers can be increased. Also, the workload of a contributor peer can
be reduced, since it will not serve many free riders anymore. As a result, better
scalability and robustness can be achieved in the P2P network, since the querying
overhead on contributor peers due to free riding can be reduced.
With those beneﬁts, we can see improvement in terms of the following quantiﬁable
metrics:
• Downloads for contributing peers can be increased;
• Downloads for free riders can be decreased;
• Amount of query traﬃc in the network can be reduced.
A motivational example and analysis about how PCMP can improve the perfor-
mance in terms of some of these metrics in a P2P network is given in Appendix A.
An important issue in realizing our approach is to identify free riders eﬃciently
and correctly. For this, we use a heuristic approach which depends on mutual ex-
changes of ﬁles and query hits between a pair of peers. Based on these exchanges,
peers try to identify free riders and contributors. After then, they take necessary
actions to modify their connections.
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4.2 A New Connection Type: One-Way Re-
quest Connections
In the current pure P2P networks like Gnutella, a connection established between
a pair of peers is used to exchange all types of P2P protocol messages in both
directions including Queries, Query Hits, Pings and Pongs (Figure 4.1). PCMP
modiﬁes this assumption by proposing a new P2P connection type called One-
Way-Request Connection (OWRC). As seen in Figure 4.2, an OWRC between
two peers is still a TCP connection and can carry messages in both directions.
However, there is a restriction on what types of messages can be carried in which
direction of the connection. The connection is called one way because it can
transfer requests in only one direction. In other words, over any OWRC the
requests (Query, Ping) can only travel in one direction and the replies (Query
Hit, Pong) can only travel in the other direction. Such a connection cannot be
used to send and receive all kinds of protocol messages in both directions at the
same time. The restrictions on the type of messages and their directions are
enforced at the application level by PCMP.
In Figure 4.2, one end of the OWRC can be considered a requester (Peer A)
and the other end as a responder (Peer B). The requester sends Query and Ping
messages and receives the corresponding Pong and Query Hit messages via the
OWRC. A responder, on the other hand, receives Query and Ping messages and
replies with Query Hit and Pong messages through the same OWRC. In the rest
of the thesis, we will call such an OWRC an OUT-connection at the requester
end and an IN-connection at the responder end. Hence, in Figure 4.2, peer A has
an OUT-connection and peer B has an IN-connection. We will also say that peer
A has an OUT-connected peer, which is peer B. And peer B has an IN-connected
peer, which is peer A.
If we would like to transfer requests from the other direction as well, from B
to A, we need to establish another OWRC directed from B to A as depicted in
Figure 4.3. However, we stress again that these connections are logical and can
be implemented on top of either one or two TCP connections.
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Figure 4.1: A general P2P connection between two peers, which enables both of
them exchange all types of P2P messages.
Figure 4.2: An OWRC between two peers, which limits the direction and the
types of P2P messages exchangeable.
Figure 4.3: Two OWRCs between two peers, which enable each peer to request
service from the other.
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Figure 4.4: A directed graph representation of a network consisting of OWRCs.
A P2P network established using OWRCs can be modelled as a directed graph. A
directed arc represents an OWRC: the tail of the arc has the peer that considers
the connection as an OUT-connection, and the head of the arc (i.e., the pointing
part) has the peer that considers the connection as an IN-connection. Hence the
requests can ﬂow along the direction of the arcs.
Figure 4.4 shows an example model of a P2P network consisting of OWRCs.
Here, peer A has 6 neighbors. It has four OUT-connected neighbors (B, D, F, G)
and three IN-connected neighbors (C, E, G). In other words, the IN-connections
of A are {C, E, G}, and the OUT-connections of A are {B, D, F, G}. When Peer
A would like to search the network it can submit the Query only to its OUT-
connected neighbors, namely B, D, F, and G. It will process the Queries only
coming from its IN-connected neighbors (C, E, G). If it receives any Query from
OUT-connected neighbors it drops the request. The details of a peer interaction
with PCMP are explained in Section 4.5.
We believe that peers would like to minimize the number of IN-connections,
and they would like to maximize the number of OUT-connections. Because,
IN-connections require a peer to process incoming Query and Ping messages,
forwarding them and returning any replies to the originator. In contrast, more
OUT-connections will help a peer to reach more peers and increase the probability
of receiving a hit to its queries. In short, IN-connections require a peer to serve
other peers, while OUT-connections allow a peer to use services oﬀered by the
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network.
4.3 Managing One-Way-Request Connections
PCMP manages OWRCs by taking the peers’ contributions into account. Net-
work topology adaptation as a result of PCMP actions aims to enable contributing
peers discover each other more quickly and get connected to each other more di-
rectly. In this way, PCMP eventually results in topologies in which contributing
peers are more closely located with respect to each other and free riders are more
isolated.
Each peer executing PCMP can maintain zero or more IN-connections, and zero
or more OUT-connections. Maximum number of IN- and OUT-connections is
limited by the available bandwidth and determined by peers. The following data
structures can be used to deﬁne an IN and OUT connection1.
IN_Connection {
long int PeerID; /*ID of the other peer*/
long int Downloads; /*download counter*/
double LastDwnldTime; /*last download time*/
}
OUT_Connection {
long int PeerID; /*ID of the other peer*/
long int QueryHits; /*Query Hit counter*/
double LastQHitTime; /*last Query Hit time*/
}
According to PCMP, connections are updated at a peer whenever that peer is
involved in a download or upload operation; otherwise, PCMP does not update
1Since node degrees in P2P networks follow a power-law distribution and average number
of neighbors of a peer is observed to be around 3-4 [55, 68], we can argue that the overhead
imposed by the solution on each peer will not be very large.
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the connections of the peer2. The details of the PCMP operations that take place
at requesting and providing peers are given below.
4.3.1 Managing IN-Connections
PCMP attempts to create an OWRC between the requesting peer (downloader)
and the providing peer (uploader). The downloader will have an IN-connection
from the uploader through which it can serve any future requests of the uploader.
Since, the new OWRC is directed from the uploader to the downloader, it is an
OUT-connection for the uploader on which the uploader can request service from
the downloader.
The details of how an IN-connection is created by the downloader are given below.
• After the download, the downloader checks if there is an already created
IN-connection coming from the uploader. If so, only the connection data
structure is updated, i.e., the download counter is incremented by 1 and
the last download time is set to the current time.
• If there is no existing IN-connection from the uploader to the downloader,
a TCP connection is created between the downloader and the uploader3.
The downloader waits for a Ping message from the uploader over the TCP
connection. Because, after uploading, uploader is expected to request an
IN-connection from downloader by sending a Ping message.
• If the downloader receives the expected Ping message from the uploader, it
proceeds with the following steps:
– If the downloader can accommodate a new IN-connection, it creates a
new connection to the uploader. It then replies with a Pong message
to the uploader. In addition, it creates an IN-connection structure,
setting the download counter to 1 and the last download time to the
2Alternatively, the connections can be updated periodically rather than with every up-
load/download operation.
3This TCP connection will be used for PCMP’s message exchange to create the new OWRC
connection. If desired, the TCP connection used for ﬁle download can be used for this purpose
as well.
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current time.
– If there is no space to create a new IN-connection, connection replace-
ment takes place. An existing IN-connection is replaced with the new
IN-connection, i.e., the existing connection is released. The connection
replacement policy is discussed in Section 4.4. Then, the downloader
replies with a Pong message to the uploader. Again, the data structure
for the connection is updated.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code for managing IN-connections.
Algorithm 1 Sample pseudo-code for managing IN-connections. A peer X will
execute this code after downloading a ﬁle from peer Y . This pseudo-code is pro-
vided here to clarify the explanation in the text, and ignores some issues present
in a real implementation. The code must be divided into several sub-functions,
some of which can be executed asynchronously, as, when a Ping message arrives.
Download of a ﬁle F from peer Y has been ﬁnished;
InConn = Search for an IN Connection to Peer Y ;
if (InConn is FOUND) then
/* update the connection structure */
InConn.Downloads++;
InConn.LastDwnldT ime = now();
else
Wait for a Ping message from Y ;
if (a Ping arrives from Y ) then
newInConn = Create IN Connection();
newInConn.peerID = Y ;
newInConn.Downloads = 1;
newInConn.LastDwnldT ime = now();
if (there is space in the IN connection list) then
Add(newInConn, IN connections);
Send a Pong message to Y ;
else
victimInConn = SelectVictim(IN Connections);
Release(victimInConn);
Add(newInConn, IN connections);
Send a Pong message to Y ;
end if
end if
end if
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4.3.2 Managing OUT-Connections
Upon uploading a ﬁle, PCMP attempts to create an OUT-connection from up-
loader to the downloader. If the connection is successfully established, the up-
loader can then use this new connection to send requests to downloader. The
operations performed by the uploader to create an OUT-connection are described
below.
• If there is an already-established OUT-connection at the peer to the down-
loader, the peer does not have to do anything, except possibly update some
statistics.
• If there is no already-established OUT-connection to the downloader, the
peer ﬁrst creates a TCP connection to the downloader, through which fur-
ther P2P messaging to create the OUT-connection can be done4. Then
the uploader sends a Ping message to the downloader through this connec-
tion. Ping signiﬁes that the uploader would like to establish an OWRC
to the downloader. The downloader will consider the new OWRC an IN-
connection, and it can either accept or reject the connection request. Nor-
mally, the downloader should accept the request if it obeys PCMP and if
the downloaded ﬁle is not a fake ﬁle. The downloader will then send a Pong
message back if it accepts the request.
• If a corresponding Pong message arrives from the downloader, the following
operations are executed.
– If the peer can accommodate a new OUT-connection, an OUT-
connection to the downloader is created. The information about down-
loader is initialized: the downloader’s ID is stored, Query Hit counter
is set to zero, and the last Query Hit time is set to -1 (i.e., the value
used when no Query Hit has been received yet).
– If there is no space for a new OUT-connection, then the connection re-
placement policy is executed and one of the existing OUT-connections
is replaced with the new connection.
4The existing TCP connection through which the upload has been performed can be used
for this purpose as well, if we do not want to a create a new TCP connection.
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According to the PCMP protocol, a peer sends query messages to OUT-connected
peers through OUT-connections. If a Query Hit is received from an OUT-
connected peer, the respective data structure for the OUT-connection is updated:
the Query Hit counter is incremented by one, and the last Query Hit time is set
to the current time.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code for managing OUT-connections.
Algorithm 2 Sample pseudo-code for managing OUT-connections. A peer Y will
execute this code after uploading a ﬁle to peer X. This pseudo-code is provided
here to clarify the explanation in the text and ignores some issues present in a
real implementation The code must be divided into several sub-functions, some
of which can be executed asynchronously, as, when a Pong message arrives.
Upload of a ﬁle F to a peer X has been ﬁnished;
OutConn = Search for an Out Connection to Peer X;
if (OutConn is FOUND) then
Update statistics;
else
Send a Ping message to X;
if (a Pong arrives from X) then
newOutConn = Create OUT Connection();
newOutConn.peerID = X;
newOutConn.QueryHits = 0;
newOutConn.LastQHitT ime = -1;
if (there is space in the OUT connection list) then
Add(newOutConn, OUT Connections);
else
victimOutConn = SelectVictim(OUT Connections);
Release(victimOutConn);
Add(newOutConn, OUT Connections);
end if
end if
end if
4.4 Connection Replacement Policy
The connection replacement policy determines how to manage a limited number
of IN and OUT-connections when all available connections of a peer are occupied
and a new connection is required. There can be several diﬀerent approaches for
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designing replacement policies. In this dissertation, we propose two connection
replacement policies. In the ﬁrst policy, the number of downloads or the number
of hit messages provided from the neighboring peer is employed to decide which
connection to replace. The connection with the least number of downloads or hit
messages provided is selected as a victim. We call the PCMP protocol employing
this policy Contribution-based PCMP (C-PCMP). In the second connection re-
placement policy, the time of the last download or the time of the last Query Hit
provided from the neighboring peer is used to select the connection for replace-
ment. The connection with the oldest time of the last download or hit messages
provided is selected as a victim. We call the PCMP protocol that applies this
policy Time-based PCMP (T-PCMP).
4.5 A Peer’s Actions and PCMP
Search: When a peer requires a ﬁle, it submits a Query through its OUT-
connections.
Forward Queries: When a peer receives a Query from one of its IN-connections,
it ﬁrst searches its local ﬁles and replies according to whether the ﬁle was found.
If the TTL value of the query is greater than 0, it forwards the Query through
its OUT-connections.
Forward Query Hits: When a peer receives a Query Hit message from one of its
OUT-connections and if the message is not destined to itself, the peer forwards
the message towards the destination by using the IN-connection through which
it has received the respective Query. The peer also updates the OUT-connected
peer data accordingly.
Download: When a peer receives a Query Hit message from one of its OUT-
connections as an answer to its Query, the peer requests the ﬁle from the uploading
peer indicated in the Query Hit. A TCP connection is established between the
peer and the uploader, and the download is started. Upon completion of the
download, the peer receives a Ping message from the uploader; an IN-connection
is created at the peer, and a Pong message is sent to the uploader as a reply to
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the Ping.
Upload: When a peer receives a Query message through one of its IN-connections,
it ﬁrst searches its local ﬁles. If it can locate a matching ﬁle, it replies with a
Query Hit message. Upon receiving the Query Hit, the Query originator requests
the ﬁle from the peer. Upon completion of the upload, the peer sends a Ping
message to the downloader to establish an OUT-connection towards that peer.
Upon receiving a corresponding Pong message from the downloader, the OUT-
connection is created and the peer can use it to send Queries.
4.6 PCMP Operation Example
As a simple example, consider the P2P network topology given in Figure 4.5.
Assume each peer can only support up to 4 IN and 4 OUT-connections and the
TTL is set to 2. The dashed circles represent the contributors (C1 and C2). In
the given topology, the Query message of an indicated contributor (C1 or C2)
cannot reach to the other one, since the indicated contributors are separated from
each other by more than two hops. Assume a ﬁle F1 and a ﬁle F3 are stored on
contributor C1, and a ﬁle F2 is stored on contributor C2. If the proposed PCMP
is applied, the following scenario will occur.
• Peer P searches P2P network for ﬁle F1 with TTL 2. C1 replies with a
Query Hit message. Then, Peer P downloads the ﬁle from the contributor
peer C1. Upon download, Peer P deletes one of its IN-connections and
adds a connection to C1 as a new IN-connection. C1 also removes (tears
down) one of its OUT-connections and adds a connection to peer P as a
new OUT-connection (see Figure 4.6).
• Then, contributor C1 searches for ﬁle F2 and the respective Query message
reaches C2 via peer P. C2 replies with a Query Hit message, and C1 down-
loads the ﬁle from C2. After download, a new connection is set up from C2
to C1. It is an OUT-connection for C2 and an IN-connection for C1 (see
Figure 4.7).
• Then, C2 searches for ﬁle F3, and C1 replies with a Hit message. After the
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Figure 4.5: A sample topology layout.
Figure 4.6: After download, Peer P updates its IN-connection by adding C1.
download has been ﬁnished, a new connection is established between C1
and C2. This time the connection is established from C1 to C2; hence it is
an OUT-connection for C1 and an IN-connection for C2 (see Figure 4.8).
As seen in the above example, when PCMP is used, two contributing peers dis-
cover each other and get connected directly. Additionally, the free riders become
further away from the contributing peers. If PCMP is not used, the two contrib-
utors could not beneﬁt from each other; only free riders would beneﬁt from this
situation.
Figure 4.7: After download, Peer C1 updates its IN-connection by adding C2.
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Figure 4.8: After download, Peer C2 updates its IN-connection by adding C1.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we present the details of PCMP by describing the main approach
and highlighting its beneﬁts. The details of two new connection types and a con-
nection management protocol are also given. Brieﬂy, we adjust the P2P network
topology dynamically in reaction to peers’ contributions. The adapted topology
favors the contributing peers in getting service from the P2P network and restricts
free riders’ utilization from the P2P network.
To evaluate PCMP in a P2P network environment, extensive simulation tests have
been conducted. The simulation results of the proposed solution are presented in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 5
GNUSIM: A new P2P Network
Simulator
In this chapter, we introduce a new P2P network simulation tool which we call
GNUSIM. We implemented GNUSIM as an event-driven P2P network and pro-
tocol simulator using CSIM 18 [89] simulation library and C++ programming
language on the WINDOWS OS. GNUSIM has been developed as a general pur-
pose P2P network simulator, while it is used in this thesis speciﬁcally to:
• validate the proposed frameworks,
• measure and evaluate their performance,
• observe their eﬀects on a P2P network, and
• compare the proposed frameworks and their variations.
The simulated P2P network model has many levels of detail such as the number
of peers and ﬁles, network topology, content distribution, content replication,
message handling, query pattern, query generation rate, free riding, and so on.
Therefore, the model can be easily extended to simulate various types of P2P
networks and protocols.
In the following sections we present the assumptions and simulation parameters
associated with GNUSIM.
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5.1 Assumptions and Parameters
The basic characteristics of the model are set to be similar to those of Gnutella
network by implementing the protocol described in [18]. We present the main
parameters of the simulation environment in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Below, details
of the important parameters and related assumptions are provided.
5.1.1 Network
Network Topology: The network topology deﬁnes the connectivity between
peers. Any network topology conﬁguration can be created by using a topology
generator and then can be fed to GNUSIM. GNUSIM simply reads the topology
from an input ﬁle. In performance tests, as a default setting we use a mesh
structure to model the network topology (see Fig. 5.1).
Figure 5.1: A mesh topology for network connections.
Messaging: There are two mailboxes within each peer. One mailbox is used for
P2P network messages, and the other is used for TCP protocol messages, namely
the download request and downloads. In this way, each mailbox simulates a port
in Gnutella and TCP/IP protocol stack running on a peer.
Connection duration: A peer is supposed to stay connected in the network
during the whole simulation lifetime.
Pinging Frequency: To check the validity of the connections with its neighbors,
each peer submits a PING message at every PINGFREQ seconds.
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Time-To-Live (TTL): In pure P2P networks, messages are broadcast into the
network. The TTL parameter is used to limit the broadcast horizon in the net-
works.
5.1.2 Peers
Peers and Peer Types: We simulate a population of peers, consisting of both
free riders and contributors. Peers are grouped based on the value assigned to
the parameter which speciﬁes the number of peer types and the corresponding
properties that are provided in Table 5.1. We selected the default values for the
peer type parameters in accordance with the observations provided in [3, 39, 70,
82, 92].
Ratio of Free Riders: At the beginning of the simulation, peers are grouped
into diﬀerent types based on the NUM OF PEER TYPES parameter. The num-
ber of peers in each type is determined according to the POPULATION RATIOS
parameter considering the total number of peers (NUM PEERS). For each peer
type, we can set FREE RIDING TYPE to determine the free riding type of
peers in that group. The values that can be assigned to FREE RIDING TYPEs
are: NONE, NON CONTRIBUTOR, CONSUMER, DROPPER, and MIXED.
MIXED means that the peers in that type are equally and randomly distributed
among all the free riding types deﬁned. Peers’ free riding types will not change
during a single run of a simulation (i.e., during the simulation lifetime).
Download and Upload Bandwidth Capacity: We assume that each peer
has a limited bandwidth capacity to download and upload ﬁles. Download ca-
pacity is assumed to be 1. There is only one download operation that can
be executed at a time. However, a peer can upload more than one ﬁle at
the same time, and the number of simultaneous uploads is limited by the
NO OF MAXIMUM UPLOADS parameter.
Download Attempts: If a peer reaches to NO OF MAXIMUM UPLOADS,
it can refuse more uploads. If a requesting peer is refused by a resource
peer, it can try another source peer if there is any in the queryHitList.
MAX DL ATTEMPT NUMBER speciﬁes how many times a peer should try to
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Parameter Deﬁnition Default Value
NUM OF PEER Number of peer types in the simulation. 3
TYPES
POPULATION Population ratios of each peer type. {0.10, 0.20,
RATIOS 0.70}
FREE RIDING Free riding types of each peer type. {NONE,
TYPE NONE,
MIXED}
SHARED Ratio of the number of shared ﬁles {0.87, 0.12,
FILE of each peer type to total number of 0.1}
RATIOS ﬁles in the simulation.
NO OF Maximum number of uploads a peer can {10, 10, 10}
MAXIMUM provide at a given time.
UPLOADS
QUERY The mean value of the exponential {60, 60, 60}
GENERATION distribution that deﬁnes the time between
MEAN two consecutive generated queries.
CONSUMER The mean value of the exponential 60
QUERY distribution that deﬁnes the time between
GENERATION two consecutive queries generated by
MEAN Consumer peers.
REPLICATION If peers’ REPLICATION property is set {true, true, false}
“true” then the downloaded ﬁles are
replicated and shared.
Table 5.1: Peer Type Parameters
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download the same ﬁle from diﬀerent source peers if any peer refuses to upload
the requested ﬁle.
5.1.3 Content
Content distribution: We distribute the content to peers uniformly
and randomly. First, peers are grouped into diﬀerent types based on
the NUM OF PEER TYPES parameter. Next, according to the given
SHARED FILE RATIOS parameter, the number of ﬁles to be distributed for
each peer type is calculated. Then, for each type of peers, the determined num-
ber of ﬁles are distributed uniformly and randomly. However, if a free rider peer
is speciﬁed as a dropper or a non-contributor, no ﬁles are distributed to it. The
ﬁles saved from this kind of peers are redistributed to consumer peers of the same
peer type.
Content replication during simulation: The settings given for the content
distribution above are valid at the beginning of the each run of the simulation.
During the simulation the content distribution can be changed according to peers’
property to replicate the downloaded ﬁles. If peers’ REPLICATION property is
set “true” then the downloaded ﬁles are replicated and shared after a successful
download. Therefore, the content distribution in the system is dynamic during
the simulation time.
Size of ﬁles: We assume that each ﬁle has the same size and the download
time for all the ﬁles are the same which is speciﬁed by the DOWNLOAD TIME
parameter.
Uniqueness of the content: The number of distinct ﬁles (DISTINCT FILES)
and replication number of these ﬁles (COPY) determine the total number of ﬁles
(TOTAL FILES) to be distributed. For example if the number of distinct ﬁles
(DISTINCT FILES) is 100 and the COPY parameter is 2, it means that the total
number of ﬁles (TOTAL FILES) in the simulation would be 200.
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Parameter Deﬁnition Default
MESSAGE Time to process any message. 0.1
PROCESSING
TIME
MESSAGE The time duration of a peer to listen 0.1
WAITING to its mailbox for any incoming message.
TIMEOUT
MESSAGE The time for keeping information about 5.0
STORING a message: when timeout occurs all information
TIMEOUT about that message is deleted from routing table.
HIT The time for a peer to wait for the QUERY HIT 5.0
WAIT messages arriving at itself before beginning
TIME to download process.
PINGFREQ The time between two consecutive Ping messages. 20.0
SATISFIED Minimum number of QUERY HITS arrived to 3
QUERY requesting peer to begin download process.
HIT
TIME TO The maximum number of hops that a message 3
LIVE can be transferred over.
MAX DL The maximum number of attempts to download 3
ATTEMPT a ﬁle from arrived QUERY HITS.
NUMBER
Table 5.2: P2P Protocol Parameters
5.1.4 Request
Request-File Matching: We assume that the system replies the queries with
exact matches only.
Request Pattern: Following a uniform distribution, peers randomly select a ﬁle
to be requested from the P2P network. After selecting a ﬁle id to be requested,
it is checked if the peer itself has the ﬁle. If the peer does not have the ﬁle, then
it generates a Query message and submits it to all its neighbors.
Request Generation Rate: The inter arrival time distribution of requests
follows exponential distribution with a mean value speciﬁed by the parameter
QUERY GENERATION MEAN.
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5.2 Summary
In this chapter, we present the details of our P2P network simulator, namely
GNUSIM. We have developed GNUSIM as a general purpose P2P network simu-
lator, which is used in this thesis speciﬁcally to validate and compare the proposed
solutions. Using GNUSIM we have conducted extensive simulation tests to evalu-
ate our solutions in a P2P network environment. In the next chapter, we provide
detailed performance results for our frameworks.
Chapter 6
Experimental Results
In this chapter, we present and discuss the results of the simulation experiments
for our two diﬀerent frameworks, namely the Detect and Punish Method (DPM)
and the P2P Connection Management Protocol (PCMP). At the end, we provide
a discussion on the comparison of these two frameworks as well.
6.1 Simulation Results for the Detect and Pun-
ish Method (DPM)
Below we ﬁrst present the assumptions and parameter values for the simulation
experiments. Then, we explain the performance metrics observed in evaluating
DPM. We then provide and discuss the results obtained in the simulation exper-
iments in terms of the performance metrics. We also study some possible attacks
to the proposed framework and their eﬀects on the system.
6.1.1 Assumptions
Our model simulates a P2P network of 900 peer nodes. The peers are inter-
connected to form a mesh topology at the beginning of a simulation run. We
assume that all peers stay connected in the same way until the end of a simulation
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Property Type A Type B Type C
Free riding type of the peers in the peer type. NONE NONE MIXED
Population ratios of each peer type. 10% 20% 70%
Ratio of shared ﬁles of each peer type to total ﬁles. 87% 12% 1%
Peers replicate the ﬁles they downloaded. True True False
Table 6.1: Properties of peer types.
run.
We assume that there are three types of peers in the simulated network: type A,
type B, and type C. Type A and type B peers are contributors. Type C peers
are free riders which can further be classiﬁed as non-contributors, droppers, or
consumers. A type C peer is randomly and uniformly assigned to one of these 3
types of free riding. The properties of peer types are summarized in Table 6.1.
The properties of each peer type include the population ratio, shared ﬁle ratio,
maximum number of simultaneous uploads possible, query generation mean, and
whether peers replicate the downloaded ﬁles or not. The default values of each
of these properties are set similar to the values reported in [3, 46, 48, 92, 101].
At the beginning of each simulation run, peers are created according to the setup
explained above and assigned to one of three main types (A,B, or C). During
simulation, peers interact with other peers according to their assigned types. For
example, a dropper drops all the messages, a non-contributor does not share any
ﬁle, etc.
There are 9000 distinct ﬁles, with four copies of each, distributed to the peer
nodes at the beginning of each simulation run. These 36000 ﬁles are uniformly
distributed to peer groups according to the type of the groups and the ﬁle sharing
ratios presented in Table 6.1. We do not distribute any ﬁles to peers that are
free riders of the non-contributor or dropper type. We assume that each ﬁle is
the same size and can be downloaded in 60 units of simulation time. During
a simulation run, peers randomly select ﬁles to search and download, and they
submit search queries for them. The inter-arrival time between search requests
generated by a peer follows an exponential distribution with a mean of 60 time
units. We assume that the query generation rate of consumer peers is twice that
of other free-riding peers.
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Each peer’s upload capacity (the number of simultaneous uploads the peer can
perform) is limited to 10. If a peer reaches upload capacity, a new upload request
is rejected by the peer. The requesting peer can then try to download the ﬁle from
another peer, selected from a list of peers obtained from the QueryHit message.
We assume that the requesting peer repeats the same request a maximum of three
times. After that, the peer gives up the downloading attempt and records this as
an unsuccessful download. Then, it can initiate a request for another ﬁle.
Each simulation experiment is run for 2000 units of simulated time, repeated 10
times, and plotted on a 95% conﬁdence interval.
6.1.2 Performance Metrics
In order to measure the performance improvement of DPM, we ﬁrst determined
a number of performance metrics. Below, we describe our metrics in detail.
• Number of downloaded ﬁles: This is an important metric indicating the
number of downloads that can be performed in a P2P system during a
ﬁxed time interval. If peers can download more ﬁles from the P2P network,
then level of satisfaction with the network will be higher.
• Number of unsuccessful downloads: The availability of content and services
in a P2P network is an important issue. A network that is providing good
service should not reject many of the contributing peers’ requests. Since the
network resources are limited, the upload capacity of peers contributing to
the network will also be limited. If this limit is exceeded, the peers will start
refusing download requests. If a peer can not be successful in downloading
a ﬁle from up to three diﬀerent source peers, it gives up downloading and
records this downloading attempt as an Unsuccessful Download.
• Number of uploads by contributors: This metric indicates the load imposed
on a peer. Contributors can become overloaded due to the excessive number
of search and download operations they are involved in. Adapting free riding
mechanisms in a P2P system, decreases the load on contributor peers by
reducing requests from free riders.
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• Download cost: We deﬁne the download cost for a peer as the ratio be-
tween the number of uploads and the number of downloads (i.e., #up-
loads/#downloads) performed by the peer. This ratio indicates the load
imposed on a peer compared to the service the peer gets from the network.
The smaller the ratio is, the better it is from the perspective of the peer.
• Number of P2P network protocol messages: This metric shows the mes-
saging overhead in the P2P network and the underlying infrastructure.
Messaging overhead aﬀects the scalability of a system. In unstructured
P2P networks particularly, the messaging overhead may be high due to the
ﬂooding approach used in querying. High numbers of protocol messages
sent over the network also increase the level of congestion in the network.
Congestion aﬀects the performance of several network services in various
ways, such as causing long delays for remote login applications, increasing
query resolution time, and decreasing the speed of downloads [7].
• Fairness: Fairness metric shows that the level of service that can be used
by a peer is proportional to the level of contribution that is provided by
that peer. In other words, a peer contributing more than what is needed
to overcome the thresholds is fairly compensated with more services. Thus,
the solution encourages peers to contribute more and rewards peers based
on the extent of their contributions.
6.1.3 Simulation Results and Analysis
In simulation experiments, we ﬁrst tested the eﬀectiveness of our detection mech-
anism in DPM. Afterwards, we conducted experiments to observe changes in the
performance of a P2P network when counter-action schemes are applied.
6.1.3.1 Evaluation of Detection Mechanism
The detection mechanism is a crucial part of the framework. Therefore, we
conducted extensive simulation experiments to measure the performance of our
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framework in detecting free riders and free riding types. We used the following
performance metrics to evaluate our detection mechanism:
• Success ratio: Ratio of peers correctly detected as free riders to peers des-
ignated as free riders in the beginning of each simulation run.
• Sensitivity ratio: Ratio of free riders whose free-riding type is correctly
detected to the number of peers who have been detected correctly as free
riders.
• False alarm ratio: Ratio of peers incorrectly detected as free riders to the
number of peers detected as free riders.
A good detection mechanism should provide high values for success and sensitivity
ratios and low value for false alarm ratio. The success ratio is an important metric
for both single and mixed counter-action schemes; sensitivity ratio on the other
hand is an important metric for mixed counter-action schemes, since in those
schemes the type of free riding determines the counter-action to be applied. The
false alarm ratio is a metric that indicates how many peers are incorrectly detected
as free riders. If the false alarm ratio is high, it means that the framework applies
counter-actions to contributors; thus some contributors are negatively aﬀected by
the incorporation of the framework into the P2P network.
An important restriction on the success of the detection mechanism is the behav-
ior and ratio of droppers. This is because free riders of the dropper type usually
can not use our detection mechanism, and hence can not apply any counter-action
to their neighbors. As they do not route other peers’ queries to their neighbors,
they may not satisfy the detection mechanism’s “routed query threshold (τQT )”
condition only by the count of their own queries. Therefore, in the overall de-
tection results, droppers may play a negative role and limit the detection mech-
anism’s success1. When the τQT threshold is decreased, however, droppers have
more chance of satisfying the threshold value by recording only their queries, and
they may then detect free riders. Thus, lowering the value of τQT increases the
success ratio in the presence of droppers, as shown in Table 6.3.
1For example, in our simulations we observed that the peers about which droppers can not
make any decision constitute around 20% of all the peers. This implies that our framework can
not reach a success ratio better than 80% with the current settings of the simulation parameters.
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Figure 6.1: Success Ratio of detection mechanism in detecting free riders and
identifying their free riding types.
Threshold Description Default Range
τQT Threshold value for the number of routed queries 50 25-100
toward a controlled peer to begin the detection
τnon contributor Threshold value for formula
QHP
QTP
0.001 0.1-0.0001
to decide if peer P is a non contributor
τconsumer Threshold value for formula
QHP
QHSP
0.1 0.05-0.5
to decide if peer P is a consumer
τdropper Threshold value for formula
QRP+QHRP
QTP
0.1 0.05-0.5
to decide if peer P is a dropper
Table 6.2: Threshold values for detection mechanism.
Figure 6.1 shows the Success Ratio of the detection mechanism for default values
of simulation parameters. The overall success ratio is about 76%. This means
that our detection mechanism is able to detect 76% of peers designated as free
riders at the start of a simulation run. The false alarm ratio is about 9%. That is,
9% of the detected free riders were not really free riders. Their interactions with
their neighbors during the simulations led the detection mechanism to identify
them as free riders2.
In Section 3.2, we use some threshold values for identifying each free riding type.
Table 6.2 shows the default values of the thresholds. Default values are based on
the P2P network traﬃc observations reported in [3, 39, 70, 84]. As part of our
simulations we try to observe the eﬀect of diﬀerent threshold values.
2This level of false alarm ratio causes 9% of the peers detected as free riders to face counter-
actions; false alarms are a side eﬀect of the detection mechanism. However, the performance
metrics show that the performance is improved for contributors despite the false alarms (see
Section 6.1.3.2).
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τQT Success Sensitivity False Alarm
25 95.39% 66.98% 13.82%
50 75.73% 66.84% 9.73%
100 75.38% 66.82% 9.70%
Table 6.3: Eﬀect of τQT threshold values on the detection mechanism.
τnon contributor Success Sensitivity False Alarm
0.1 76.54% 66.12% 42.87%
0.01 76.54% 66.12% 29.45%
0.001 75.73% 66.84% 9.73%
0.0001 73.03% 69.27% 5.24%
Table 6.4: Eﬀect of τnon contributor threshold values on the detection mechanism.
In Table 6.3, we observe that when the τQT threshold is set to lower values,
the detection mechanism begins to detect earlier and the success ratio increases.
However, the false alarm ratio also becomes worse with low values of τQT because
the system tries to decide about a peer with less information available. There is
therefore a trade-oﬀ between success and false alarm ratios and this trade-oﬀ is
aﬀected by the τQT threshold. Sensitivity is not greatly aﬀected by the value of
the τQT threshold.
Another threshold used in the detection mechanism is τnon contributor, which is
used to decide if a peer is a non-contributor. Table 6.4 shows the eﬀect of this
threshold. Interestingly, for some large values such as 0.1 and 0.01 the success
ratio does not change much, but the false alarm ratio changes and becomes too
high. This result suggests that high values not be used for this threshold. The
success ratio does not change much for diﬀerent high values of the threshold,
because even the precision of the ratio is diﬀerent the number of detected peers
with 0.01 is almost the same as with the value 0.1. That is, most of the non-
contributor peers have a QHP
QTP
ratio less than 0.01. Therefore, the comparison
leads to a similar success ratio. In Table 6.4, we again observe that the success
ratio is (negatively) correlated with the false alarm ratio.
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Figure 6.2: Decrease in free riding peers’ downloads when diﬀerent counter-
actions are applied.
6.1.3.2 Evaluation of Counter-Actions
In Section 3.3 we proposed two types of counter-action schemes: single and mixed.
We implemented three diﬀerent single counter-action schemes: DROP, TTL-4,
and TTL-2. We also implemented a mixed counter-action. This section evaluates
the eﬀectiveness of these schemes. The metrics we used in our evaluation are
described in Section 6.1.2.
• Downloads of free riders: As Figure 6.2 shows, the number of downloads by
free riders drops when mechanisms against free riding are applied. Counter-
actions against free riders decrease the reach of the Query messages sent by
peers detected as free riders; this reduces the chance of getting a hit to one
of these queries. In this way, the average number of downloads by free riders
is reduced. For example, the DROP counter-action causes a 89% reduction
in the number of downloads by free riders. The least successful counter-
action is the TTL-2 single counter-action, which achieves a 12% reduction.
But even the least successful counter-action scheme leads to fewer free rider
downloads than not using any counter-action at all.
The success of the DROP counter-action is expected, since when all the
queries submitted by free riders are dropped, those peers can not get
QueryHit messages back, and therefore they can not download ﬁles. They
can only download until they are detected. The other schemes are able
to reduce the search horizon of the queries submitted by free riders, but
the free riders still have the chance to get QueryHit messages and perform
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Figure 6.3: Increase in contributors’ downloads when diﬀerent counter-actions
are applied.
downloads. The mixed counter-action scheme yields the second-best result.
We believe that this approach has important consequences compared to sin-
gle action schemes. Considering the potential false alarms that can be given
by the detection mechanism, applying a diﬀerent counter-action depending
on the severity of free riding helps us to better deal with false alarms as
discussed below.
• Downloads of contributors: It is desirable to increase the number of down-
loads for contributors. Since peers’ upload capacity is limited, the download
requests of contributors can sometimes be rejected. The rate of rejection is
higher when there are many free riders in the system. Hence eliminating the
eﬀects of free riders on the P2P network will help to increase the number
of downloads that contributors can make. This is indeed shown in Fig-
ure 6.3; applying our schemes achieves an increase in downloads performed
by contributors as much as 10%.
Figure 6.3 shows an important point; improvement in downloads is greater
with a mixed counter-action compared to that with any single counter-
action. While the mixed counter-action scheme produces about a 10% im-
provement, the two single counter-actions, TTL-2 and TTL-4, can produce
about a 7% improvement. The DROP counter-action scheme actually re-
duces the number of downloads by contributors. We think this is due to
false alarms in detection mechanisms. When we apply strict counter-actions
such as DROP, the number of misdetected peers that are negatively aﬀected
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Figure 6.4: Decrease in P2P messages of free riding peers when diﬀerent counter-
actions are applied.
Figure 6.5: Decrease in P2P messages of all peers when diﬀerent counter-actions
are applied.
is signiﬁcant. On the other hand, a mixed scheme handles false alarms bet-
ter by applying diﬀerent counter-actions to diﬀerent types of free riders, and
therefore can provide diﬀerent levels of punishment, from light to severe, to
peers suspected as free riders.
• Amount of P2P protocol messages: The number of P2P protocol messages
transmitted in the network is an important factor aﬀecting the scalability
of the P2P network. Counter-actions against free riders result in up to 78%
reduction in the number of transmitted P2P protocol messages (Query and
QueryHit) originating from and destined to free riders (Figure 6.4).
When we compare the reductions in transmitted P2P control messages for
diﬀerent counter-actions, we see that the DROP single counter-action again
gives the best results (78%). The mixed counter-action scheme, on the other
hand, reduces the control traﬃc due to free riders by about 68%.
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If we evaluate the counter-actions with respect to their eﬀect on reduc-
ing the total P2P control traﬃc in the network (i.e., the control traﬃc
due to the free riders plus the contributors), we see that the DROP single
counter-action scheme leads to a reduction of about 68%, whereas the mixed
counter-action scheme leads to a reduction of about 58% (Figure 6.5). The
least successful counter-action is TTL-2 which leads to a reduction of 31%.
All these results show that applying the proposed framework helps a P2P
network handle more peers with less control-messaging overhead and the
system becomes more scalable with respect to the peer population.
The reduction observed in the number of protocol messages is the result of
reducing or stopping the propagation of Query messages from free riders.
As we restrict the propagation of Query messages by free riders, we also
reduce QueryHit messages destined to free riders. The reduction of control
traﬃc in a P2P network also means a reduction of traﬃc overhead imposed
on the underlying infrastructure. This reduction translates to a better uti-
lization of link bandwidths, and to a decreased processing load on the nodes
constituting the underlying infrastructure.
• Uploads of contributors: A metric that can indicate the load on a peer is
the number of uploads performed by the peer in a given time period. With
our framework we want to achieve a reduction of the load on contributors.
We expect that if we reduce the downloads of free riders, we can also reduce
uploads, since a large portion of these uploads are done to free riders. In
simulation experiments, we observed a signiﬁcant reduction in the number
of uploads done by contributors when a counter-action scheme is applied.
As Figure 6.6 shows, the scheme that gives the best result is again the
DROP single counter-action scheme, causing a reduction of about 68%.
The mixed counter-action scheme causes a reduction of about 35%.
• Download Cost: The load on a contributor can also be deﬁned in a diﬀerent
way as a normalized load, i.e., as the ratio of uploads to downloads. The
results of our experiments show that our framework also causes a reduction
in the download cost of contributors. As it can be derived from Figure 6.7,
the framework achieves a 65% reduction in the contributors’ download cost
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Figure 6.6: Decrease in contributors’ uploads when counter-actions are applied.
Figure 6.7: Decrease in contributors’ download cost when counter-actions are
applied.
when the DROP single counter-action is applied. The framework achieves
a 41% reduction when a mixed counter-action scheme is applied.
• Unsuccessful Downloads: We also looked at the improvement achieved in
the number of unsuccessful downloads when the proposed counter-action
schemes are used. As Figure 6.8 shows, the DROP single counter-action
achieves the best improvement; the number of unsuccessful downloads is
reduced by 97%. The mixed counter-action scheme, on the other hand,
reduces the number by about 70%. The decrease in the number of unsuc-
cessful downloads means that contributors can better access the network
resources when the proposed mechanisms are used. Free riders’ requests
and downloads may prevent non-free rider peers from accessing ﬁles and
other resources. When the traﬃc due to free riders is reduced, the contrib-
utors start reaching to the resources more easily and get better satisﬁed
with P2P network services.
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Figure 6.8: Decrease in contributors’ unsuccessful downloads when counter-
actions are applied.
Figure 6.9: Increasing utility values for increasing number of ﬁles shared by a
probe node.
• Fairness: To observe the fairness of DPM, we conducted several simulation
experiments. In these experiments, we randomly chose a probe peer and
assigned to it diﬀerent number of ﬁles to share. As seen in Figure 6.9, we
assigned to the probe peer none (0), 25, 50, 100, and 200 ﬁles, and observed
the Download/Query ratio (number of downloads / number of submitted
queries) as an indication of peer’s utility from the system.
As the ﬁgure shows, although the probe peer submits nearly the same num-
ber of queries, it can download diﬀerent number of ﬁles depending on how
much ﬁles it shares. Because, when it shares less ﬁles while requesting the
same amount of service, it will face counter-actions, and this will limit the
number of downloads it will be able to get. On the other hand, when it
shares more ﬁles, monitoring peers will not apply any counter-action, thus
it will be able to reach more peers and download more ﬁles. Therefore, if
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two peers have similar query patterns but provide diﬀerent levels of service
to the system, they will get diﬀerent levels of utility from the system as well.
Thus, DPM is fair. In other words, a peer contributing more than what
is needed to overcome the threshold is fairly compensated. Hence, DPM
does not only encourage peers to provide enough services to overcome the
threshold barrier, but also encourages them to contribute more to get better
service.
6.1.4 Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Parameter Values
We also executed sensitivity experiments to observe how DPM performs for dif-
ferent values of important parameters: the number of peers and the level of free
riding. We also observed the performance results for diﬀerent values of TTL
modifying counter-action. We found that in spite of diﬀerent parameter settings,
DPM provides consistent performance gains.
• The number of peers in the simulated network: Considering the size of
the Gnutella network, the number of peers simulated in our work can be
considered to be very small. However, since our detection and counter-
action mechanisms require only local interactions between neighbors, the
number of peers in the network should not aﬀect the performance of the
proposed approach. This is indeed what we have observed in the results
of our experiments that are performed for various network sizes: 400, 900,
1600, and 2500 peers. Figure 6.10 displays the performance results in terms
of the number of downloads by free riders. As shown in the ﬁgure, the
decrease in the number of downloads of free riders is around %50 for all
four diﬀerent network sizes. Therefore, we conclude that increasing the
number of peers in the network does not aﬀect the performance of our
framework, and our framework is scalable.
• The Size of Free Rider Population: We also observed the eﬀect of the size of
free rider population in terms of the three metrics mentioned above. As seen
in Table 6.5, regardless of the ratio of free riders, our framework achieves
a reduction in the number of downloads of free riders. For a smaller ratio
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Figure 6.10: Decrease in free riders’ downloads when diﬀerent numbers of peers
are simulated.
FR # Downloads # Downloads Change(%)
Population (%) with DPM without DPM
60% 554 1306 -58%
70% 562 1142 -51%
80% 631 1219 -48%
90% 544 901 -40%
Table 6.5: Eﬀect of free rider population on the number of free riders’ downloads.
of free riders in the overall population of peers, the reduction in downloads
of free riders is more pronounced (50%). For a higher ratio of free riders,
however, the reduction is still good and is about 40%.
For the second metric, the number of downloads of contributors, the results
show that as the size of free rider population increases, our framework
provides more downloads for contributors. As seen in Table 6.6, the increase
in the number of downloads by contributors reaches up to 36%.
Table 6.7 shows the impact of free rider population ratio on the messaging
FR # Downloads # Downloads Change(%)
Population (%) with DPM without DPM
60% 711 701 1%
70% 438 391 12%
80% 314 266 18%
90% 105 77 36%
Table 6.6: Eﬀect of free rider population on the number of contributors’ down-
loads.
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FR # P2P messages # P2P messages Change(%)
Population (%) with DPM without DPM
60% 973189 1994822 -51%
70% 826705 1932032 -57%
80% 768145 1706333 -55%
90% 711429 1736857 -59%
Table 6.7: Eﬀect of free rider population on the number of P2P messages of all
peers.
Figure 6.11: Downloads of Free Riders when diﬀerent counter actions are em-
ployed.
overhead in the network. As the ratio of free riders increases, the gain that
we achieve with our framework also increases. When, for example, the ratio
of free riders is as high as 90%, the reduction in P2P control traﬃc seen in
the network as a result of the application of our framework is 59%.
• Modifying TTL with diﬀerent values: We would like to provide some of the
results we obtained when diﬀerent values were used to decrease TTL other
than the default value 1. In the ﬁgures 6.11 and 6.12, it can be observed
the performance eﬀect of TTL-2, TTL-3, TTL-4, TTL-5, and TTL-6 along
with Mixed and Drop actions. As seen in Figure 6.11, TTL-2 has the least
eﬀect while TTL-6 is most eﬀective in reducing the download of free riders.
We also provide the results in terms of the reduction in the number of P2P
messages of free riders in Figure 6.12.
The level of the eﬀect of modifying TTL counter action is increasing with
the decrement value applied. That is, if we use a large decrement value,
e.g. 5 or 6, the positive eﬀect of the counter action increases. As expected,
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Figure 6.12: The Number of P2P messages of Free Riders when diﬀerent counter
actions are employed.
we observed that TTL-2 had the least improvement on the performance
and, TTL-6 and TTL-5 yield similar results to that of the DROP counter
action. However, TTL-4 produced a mid point between them. Therefore,
to give some insight of the eﬀect of modifying TTL action on the system
performance, we select TTL-2 and TTL-4 as representative values.
6.1.5 Possible Attacks
In this section, we describe a list of possible counter attacks against DPM. We
also discuss how our framework would react and how we can defend against those
kinds of attacks.
6.1.5.1 Fake QueryHit Messages
A free rider can cheat its neighbors (monitoring peers) by replying to some queries
with QueryHit messages fraudulently as if it has the requested ﬁle. When the
requesting peer asks for the ﬁle, it may just refuse uploading it. In this way
it may pretend as it is serving well, since controlled peers may not be aware
of unsuccessful download and cheating. In the log tables of its neighbors, the
malicious peer may seem to be a non-free rider because of its QueryHit replies.
Given the descriptors in Gnutella protocol [18], it may not be possible for a
controlled peer to observe and perceive this kind of fake messages. Because,
download occurs between two peers outside the P2P network and there is no
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Descriptor Description Content
Notify Used to report a suspected peer that Query Descriptor Id;
refused to upload the ﬁle it provided Suspected peer IP; File Index
in QueryHit descriptor in respond to
a given Query descriptor.
Table 6.8: New Protocol Descriptor
feedback mechanism for downloads in unstructured P2P networks. To handle
this kind of fake QueryHit messages, we propose to use a new descriptor: Notify
(see Table 6.8). This descriptor is used to report about a malicious peer to its
neighbor. When a querying peer is refused by a responding malicious peer during
a download attempt, the querying peer may send a Notify descriptor through
the P2P network to reach the monitoring neighbor of the malicious peer. To
avoid an increase in the network traﬃc, the querying peer does not broadcast the
descriptor message. Instead, it forwards the descriptor only to the neighbor which
has delivered the QueryHit message, containing the IP address of the denying
peer. Any intermediate peer on the way to the denying peer forwards the Notify
message to only one of its neighbors based on the message ID (GUID) of the
Query message stored in its query routing table3. The monitoring peer on the
path to the denying peer is the neighbor of the denying peer. After processing the
Notify message, the last peer logs this message, and takes the necessary action
against the malicious peer.
There could be some side eﬀects of the proposed Notify descriptor. A malicious
peer can initiate an application-layer Denial of Service (DoS) attack using the
Notify messages. However, almost every message type in P2P protocol (Query,
QueryHit, Push, Ping, and Pong) can be exploited in order to launch denial of
service attacks [21, 23, 24, 63]. Some proposals exist in the literature aiming
to counter the application-layer DoS attacks [23, 76, 86]. We think that we can
also use some schemes to deal with DoS attacks using the Notify message. One
scheme can be based on the comparison of the number of Notify messages routed
3Since, as a requirement of Gnutella P2P Protocol, the Query messages are stored in the
routing table of each peer for some time to route back the possible QueryHit messages, we do
not need to store extra state information that can be used to route the Notify message on
intermediate peers.
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by each controlled peer. If a monitoring peer detects a big diﬀerence among the
number of Notify messages routed by its controlled peers, it can begin to ﬁlter
(delete/drop) Notify messages coming from that controlled peers (similar to what
is proposed in [23]). Since the danger of DoS attack exists for all P2P protocol
messages, we think that the precautions taken for other P2P messages can be
applied for Notify message as well. Prevention of DoS attacks is out of the scope
of our current work, however, it can be interesting to investigate the applicability
and eﬀectiveness of the two simple schemes described above as a future work.
6.1.5.2 Fake Files
Free riders could also share dummy ﬁles with popular names in order to cheat
querying peers. These ﬁles can be very small in size to reduce upload overhead.
In that way, free rider peers can conceal themselves. This situation however, can
also be prevented by using the Notify descriptor proposed above.
6.1.5.3 Hiding Query Ownership
In our free riding detection mechanism, the monitoring peers exploit the TTL
ﬁeld value of the incoming Query messages to decide if the controlled peer is the
owner of the message or not. If the TTL value of the Query message is equal to
the max TTL value, then the Query message is assumed to be originated at the
neighbor.
If a free rider wants to prevent monitoring peers applying the counter-actions
against its queries, it may try to hide its ownership of the queries by setting the
TTL ﬁeld to a value diﬀerent than the standard maximum TTL value. Then the
originator of the Query will not be identiﬁed correctly by a monitoring peer. If
the free rider sets TTL to a value greater than the allowed maximum value, this
can easily be detected by the monitoring peer. If the free rider sets TTL to a
value less than the allowed maximum, then the free rider harms itself by reducing
the search horizon of the Query. In this case we think that there is no need to
take an extra action, since we expect that a free rider will not decrease its search
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Metric Standard Malicious Change
TTL TTL (%)
# Downloads of FRs 1198 840 -29.90%
# Downloads of non-FRs 920 937 1.85%
# P2P Messages of FRs 1086650 842450 -22.47%
# P2P Messages of all peers 1973761 1675965 -15.09%
# Uploads of non-FRs 2094 1757 -16.09%
# Unsuccessful Downloads of non-FRs 147 62 -56.34%
Table 6.9: Results of free rider (FR) malicious TTL attack (mixed counter-action
applied).
horizon voluntarily4.
We observed the eﬀects of this kind of malicious action in our simulations, and
Table 6.9 provides the results5. During the experiments, we assumed that all
free riders act maliciously with regard to the initial TTL value setting in Query
messages. This is the worst case for our framework. We argue that although
free riders may prevent the monitoring peers from applying counter-actions by
using malicious TTL values, their level of beneﬁts from the system and their
negative eﬀects on the system will also decrease considerably if they set the TTL
value maliciously. When they cheat on TTL, they actually reduce the reach of
their own queries, and hence the quality of the results they get. As Table 6.9
shows, when a malicious TTL value is used, the amount of downloads of free
riders decreases. The number of P2P messages observed in the network due to
free riders also decreases. Hence, acting maliciously on the TTL value does not
help to the free riders. Therefore, we do not see an urgent need to develop a
solution against this kind of TTL attack.
4This is because using an initial TTL value even one less than the allowed maximum decreases
the search horizon dramatically. For example, if a free rider submits a Query message with an
initial TTL value of 6 in a network where the maximum allowed value is 7, then the free rider
loses about 67% of its reach (search horizon) compared to submitting the Query with a TTL
value of 7.
5We have used the mixed counter scheme while performing simulation experiments for eval-
uating the eﬀects of attacks to the framework.
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Metric No Peers Only Contributors Change
apply DPM apply DPM (%)
# Downloads of FRs 2430 2130 -12.30%
# Downloads of non-FRs 840 853 1.5%
# P2P Messages of FRs 3449416 2672604 -22.51%
# P2P Messages of all peers 4679878 3791657 -19%
# Uploads of non-FRs 3216 2939 -8.60%
# Unsuccessful Downloads 477 413 -13.40%
of non-FRs
Table 6.10: Results of free riders (FR) insuﬃcient cooperation attack (mixed
counter-action applied).
6.1.5.4 Insuﬃcient Cooperation Against Free Riding
Some peers may be reluctant to use the proposed mechanisms against free riding
or malicious peers may collude with their neighbors to hide each other’s “free-
riding status”. Thus, free riders may attack the system by disabling the proposed
framework. As a result, we may observe low level of cooperation against free
riding due to the high population of free riders. We have simulated such an
environment by applying the worst-case scenario (all free riders collude) and
observed the results. We have compared the case when our framework is applied
by only contributors with the case when our framework is not applied at all. In
Table 6.10, we provide the results for both cases.
As Table 6.10 shows, even though only 30% of peers apply the mechanisms (they
are contributors), the number of downloads of free riders is decreased, the mes-
saging overhead is reduced, and the load on contributors is decreased compared
to the case when our framework is not applied. This implies that our mechanisms
are quite robust against the type of attack where some peers disable the proposed
mechanisms by either collusion or modifying their client software.
6.1.5.5 Constantly Changing Neighbors
A free riding peer may attack the framework by constantly changing its neighbors,
and thus it may keep utilizing the services without ever being identiﬁed as a free
rider.
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As discussed in Section 3.1, the P2P network traﬃc observations [84, 92, 39]
show that peers tend to stay connected quite long periods of time. One of the
reasons for that is the practical diﬃculty of disconnecting and re-connecting again.
Another reason is that a peer does not get query hit messages immediately after
it has submitted a query. A peer should not change its neighbors for the time
period between submission of a query and the arrival of the respective query hits
(name it search-QueryHit cycle duration). If the peer breaks the existing links
too fast, it will not get a reply. Therefore, the peer should stay connected for
at least a certain time interval which should be longer than the search-QueryHit
cycle duration.
Hence, if our scheme can detect a free rider and apply a counter-action against
it in a time interval that is less than the search-QueryHit cycle duration, then
the attack will not work and it will not make much sense for a free rider to try
this. Therefore it is important to know how long it takes to get query hits back
and how long it takes to detect the free riders. These concerns depend on several
factors. The success ratio (the ratio of free riders that are detected correctly) can
give us a clue about the speed of our detection mechanism. Figure 6.13 plots the
success ratio versus simulation time. At the beginning of a simulation run, the
success ratio will be zero since there is no free rider detected yet. Towards the
end of the simulation run, however, the success ratio will have a value that can
be close to 1 in ideal case.
In Figure 6.13, we observe that, with the default settings of simulation parame-
ters, at time 90, 40% of free riders are detected successfully. At time 150, 60%
of free riders are detected successfully6. From the ﬁgure we can see that free
riders start becoming detected after 50 time units. Therefore, if a free rider peer
would like to avoid detection, it should change its neighbors every 50 time units,
with the default parameter settings. If it changes its neighbors at a rate slower
than this, let’s say every 100 time units, the chance to be detected and to face
counter-actions becomes increased. The probability of detection becomes around
45% for 100 time units.
6If the P2P network traﬃc becomes higher (i.e., more queries are forwarded), the time
required to exceed the τQT threshold will be sooner and free riders will be detected faster.
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Figure 6.13: The Success of the detection mechanism in the ﬁrst 200 simulation
time.
To investigate the eﬀectiveness of the potential attack, we modiﬁed our simulation
code to simulate this attack, and conducted several sets of new experiments.
In these experiments, we ﬁrst randomly selected a probe peer to act as a free
rider applying the attack. During a simulation run, the probe peer changes its
neighbors periodically using a ﬁxed time period between changes. We measured
the utility the probe peer gets from the P2P network at the end of a simulation
run. The utility is expressed as the ratio of the number of downloads the probe
peer performs to the number of queries it submits. We obtained results for two
diﬀerent time intervals between changes of neighbors: 50 and 100 time units.
The results are displayed in Figure 6.14. In the ﬁgure, we also included two other
utility values. One is the utility value that a contributor peer can get and the
other is the utility value that a free rider who is not trying the attack (i.e., not
changing connections) can get.
As can be seen in Figure 6.14, the probe peer succeeded to increase its utility by
changing its neighbors constantly. We can observe that the length of the time
period between changes has an eﬀect on the service the probe peer receives, as
we have discussed above. If this period is longer, the probability of detection gets
increased and the probe peer will more likely face counter-actions; and this will
reduce the service it will get.
However, the ﬁrst experiment we describe above can not reﬂect a real-life scenario
where lots of peers would like to apply the attack at the same time. Therefore
we also conducted experiments for the scenario where all free riders in the net-
work apply the attack expecting to increase the utility they get. The results
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Figure 6.14: The results for the Probe peer, when the attack is only applied by
the probe free riding peer.
Figure 6.15: The results for the Probe peer, when the attack is applied by all the
free riding peers.
are displayed in Figure 6.15. As seen in the ﬁgure, the probe node acting as a
free rider and applying the attack is negatively aﬀected in this case when all free
riders in the network apply the attack. This is because, one of the side eﬀects
of the suggested attack is that when all free rider peers change their neighbors,
their previous neighbors lose the connection via these peers and they would lose
the possible incoming QueryHit messages as well. Since the QueryHit messages
in unstructured P2P networks are routed back through the same route of the
received Query messages, when an intermediate peer tries to route a QueryHit
which is routed by a free rider peer, it could not route it anymore, due to the
changed neighbors. So, some of the QueryHit messages would be dropped with-
out reaching to the destined peers. As observed in the ﬁgure, this side eﬀect is
not negligible. The probe peer loses its advantage considerably when all other
free riders also apply the same attack.
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Therefore, we can conclude that although the attack seems to increase the utility
of an individual free rider, in a more general and real situation, when all or most
of the free riders apply the attack, the utility that a free rider gets is not increased
to a level to justify the practical diﬃculties of applying the attack. The free rider
will not reach to a level of utility comparable to that of a contributor peer.
6.1.5.6 Increasing Number of Neighbors
A free rider can try to enlarge its search horizon by increasing the number of
neighbors it connects to. It is not easy to totally prevent them doing so without
changing the nature of unstructured P2P systems and without loosing major
advantages of these systems. However we believe that the attack is not so practical
for free riders to apply and it does not lead a signiﬁcant increase in their utility.
Below, we would like to provide a simple analysis for the eﬀectiveness of the
attack. Later, we share some results of the simulation experiments obtained
when the attack is applied.
Assume that in a P2P system, average number of connections per peer is 4 and
maximum TTL is 7. If a free rider employs the attack as suggested above, it
can connect to new nodes and but soon after it would be detected by these
peers as well and be subjected to some counter-action. Therefore, its messages’
TTL will be decreased always to some value or will totally be dropped. If TTL-
4 is implemented as a counter-action, the decremented TTL of the free rider’s
Queries would be 3 (7-4). Now, we would like to ﬁnd the number of peers to
be connected to provide the same amount of connectivity when TTL is 7. As a
general assumption, we think that the probability of getting QueryHit messages to
Queries is positively correlated with the number of peers connected. Therefore,
the attack suggests connecting more peers even with reduced search horizon.
When TTL is 7, a peer can connect to 4372 peers at most (4 connection per peer
is assumed) When TTL is 3, the peer can reach 52 peers at most. Therefore, it
loose 4372-52=4320 peers. To compensate this, it will try to connect to other
peers with TTL 3 (because, as its new neighbors will discover it as a free rider
sooner). Therefore, each newly connected neighbor can provide at most 17 peers
(including itself). To have the same amount of connectivity, free riding peer
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Figure 6.16: The results for the Download/Query ratio, when the increased num-
ber of neighbors attack is applied by a probe peer.
should connect to (4320/17)= 254 new peers. That is, while average/contributor
peers have 4-peer connectivity to cover the same number of peers, free riding peer
will have to make about 64 times more connections (total 258 connections). We
think that it is not easy and practical to do. One of the practical drawbacks is
the fact that more neighbors mean more P2P messages to process, which could
create a big burden on the peer considering the high amount of P2P traﬃc in
real life application. Even though the peer may choose to drop these messages,
they will still reach to the application layer and will degrade the performance of
the peer’s system.
We have conducted several experiments to observe the eﬀects of the suggested
attack. As seen in Figure 6.16, download/query ratio for a contributor peer with
4 neighbors is about 14%. On the other hand, a free rider peer with the same
amount of connection has download/query ratio of only 6% due to the Mixed
counter-action applied. It is an expected result and in line with the prior results
provided. Even we increase the number of connected neighbors ﬁve times, free
rider peer could not attain the same download/query ratio of a contributor peer.
When the free rider peer has 6 or 7 times more connections, it then exceeds the
download/query ratio of a contributor peer.
Another important observation from the experiments is that the increase in the
number of neighbors comes with a cost, i.e. the increasing number of P2P mes-
sages. The free rider peer with more connections should devote much more re-
sources to process P2P messages. For example, a free rider peer with 6 times more
connections has to deal with almost 8 times more P2P messages(see Figure 6.17).
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Figure 6.17: The results for the P2P Message/Simulation time ratio , when the
increased number of neighbors attack is applied by a probe peer.
We believe that in a much larger P2P network, this could easily be a bottleneck
for the peer. The message queue could easily be overloaded and overﬂowed.
As a result, we could state that there can be some ways to attack, but free
riders will experience various diﬃculties in applying them, due to our proposed
mechanisms.
6.2 Simulation Results for the P2P Connection
Management Protocol (PCMP)
Below we ﬁrst present the assumptions and parameter values involved in the simu-
lation experiments. Then, we explain the performance metrics used in evaluating
the proposed framework. Later, we provide and discuss the results observed in
terms of the performance metrics. We also investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent pa-
rameter values on the results. As a last discussion, we provide some possible
attacks to the proposed framework and their eﬀects on the system.
6.2.1 Assumptions
Assumptions made for the simulation experiments are similar to those presented
in Section 6.1.1 and used in the evaluation of DPM. We would like to remind the
important parameter settings used before. Our model simulated a P2P network
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Property Contributors Free Riders
Population ratios 30% 70%
Ratio of shared ﬁles of each 99% 1%
peer type to total ﬁles
Peers replicate the ﬁles they True False
have downloaded
Mean time between queries 60 time units 60 time units
(exponentially distributed)
Maximum simultaneous uploads 10 10
Table 6.11: Properties of peer types.
of 900 peer nodes. The peers were inter-connected to form a mesh topology at the
beginning of a simulation run. For the base experiments with only the Gnutella
protocol (i.e. without PCMP), we assumed that all the peers stayed connected
in the same way until the end of simulation run.
We assumed that there were two types of peers in the simulated network: con-
tributors and free riders. The properties of each peer type are summarized in
Table 6.11.
There were 9000 distinct ﬁles, with four copies of each, distributed to the peer
nodes at the beginning of each simulation run. These 36000 ﬁles were distributed
among the peers and shared according to the ﬁle sharing ratios shown in Ta-
ble 6.11. For the base experiments, we assumed that each ﬁle was of the same
size and could be downloaded in 60 units of simulation time. In Section 6.2.4 we
relax this assumption.
During a simulation run, peers randomly selected ﬁles to search for download, and
they submitted search queries for them. The inter-arrival time between search
requests generated by a peer followed an exponential distribution with a mean of
60 time units.
Each peer’s upload capacity (the number of simultaneous uploads the peer could
perform) was limited to 10. If a peer reached its upload capacity, any new upload
request was rejected. The querying peer could then try to download the ﬁle from
another peer, selected from a list obtained from the Query Hit message. We
assumed that the querying peer would repeat the same request a maximum of
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three times. After that, the peer would give up and could initiate a new search for
another ﬁle. We assumed that TTL is set to be 3 hops. Simulation experiments
are run for 4000 units of simulated time, repeated 10 times, and plotted on a 95%
conﬁdence interval.
In order to match the topology of the base model, we assumed that each peer
could provide up to four IN- and four OUT-connections. This is because the
base model compared with PCMP has a mesh topology with an average of four
connections per peer.
6.2.2 Performance Metrics
To evaluate our protocol, we deﬁned and studied two families of metrics: 1)
topology-related metrics, 2) performance-related metrics. Using the ﬁrst type of
metrics, we aimed to investigate the change in the P2P network topology in favor
of contributing peers. The details of the topology-related metrics are presented
below.
• Total number of connections among contributors: We count the number of
connections (IN and OUT) which connect the contributors directly to each
other. We expect that if the number of connections among contributors is
increased, the contributors will get better service from the network. Since
we assume the number of connections that a peer can have to be limited,
those connections have to be used carefully by contributors. In order to
get better service and more Query Hits, a contributor should have more
connections to other contributors and less connections to free riders. In
this way, a contributor can also reduce free riding through itself. This
metric also shows how successful the PCMP protocol is in discovering and
connecting contributors.
• Total number of OUT-connections from free riders to contributors: As
stated in Section 4.2, if a peer has an OUT-connection to another peer, the
peer can submit queries through this connection to that peer. Hence, the
number of OUT-connections a peer has increases its chance to get replies
and service from the network. Therefore, we count the total number of
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OUT-connections that free riders have towards contributors to measure
how eﬀective our protocol is in reducing free riders’ access to resources.
• Number of isolated free riders: One of the aims of our protocol is to isolate
free riders from contributors in the P2P network. If a free rider has no
OUT-connection, then it cannot send any query and cannot receive any
service, and we consider such a peer to be isolated. An isolated peer cannot
download any ﬁles from the network. The greater the number of isolated
free riders, the better it is for the network.
The second type of metrics that we deﬁned are related to the performance and
service the peers get from the network. They are used to measure the performance
and service improvement in the network when PCMP is employed.
• Number of downloaded ﬁles: This is an important metric indicating the
number of downloads that can be performed in a P2P network during a
ﬁxed time interval. If peers can download more ﬁles from the P2P network,
then the level of satisfaction with the network will be higher.
• Number of uploads by contributors: This metric indicates the load imposed
on a peer. Contributors can become overloaded due to the excessive number
of search and download operations executed mainly by free riders.
• Download cost: We deﬁne the download cost for a peer as the ratio of the
number of uploads to the number of downloads performed by the peer. This
ratio indicates the load imposed on a peer compared to the service the peer
gets from the network. The smaller this ratio is, the better it is from the
perspective of the peer.
• Number of P2P network protocol messages: This metric is an indication
of the messaging overhead in the P2P network and the underlying infras-
tructure. Messaging overhead aﬀects the scalability of a P2P system. The
messaging overhead may be high due to the ﬂooding approach used in query-
ing, particularly in unstructured P2P networks. A high number of protocol
messages sent over the network also increases the level of congestion in the
network.
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Figure 6.18: Increase in the number of connections among contributing peers.
• Fairness: Fairness metric shows that the level of service that can be ob-
tained by a peer is proportional to the level of contribution that is provided
by that peer. In other words, a peer contributing more is fairly compensated
with more services.
6.2.3 Simulation Results and Analysis
In simulation experiments, we ﬁrst tested the eﬀectiveness of PCMP in connecting
the contributors to each other. Afterwards, we conducted experiments to observe
changes in the performance when PCMP is employed.
6.2.3.1 Impact of PCMP on Network Topology
Figure 6.18 shows the number of connections established among contributing
peers over the simulation time. The results are for a P2P network employing our
PCMP protocol using the time-based replacement policy (T-PCMP). As seen
in the ﬁgure, the protocol causes more contributing peers to become directly
connected to each other as time passes. By the end of the simulation, the number
of connections (IN and OUT) among contributors increased from 309 to 562.
Hence, connectivity among contributors increased by 82%.
Figure 6.19 shows the number of OUT-connections of free riders to contributing
peers plotted against the simulation time. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the
protocol caused the number of OUT-connections of free riders to decrease by
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Figure 6.19: Decrease in the number of OUT-connections from free riders to
contributors.
Figure 6.20: The number of isolated free riders.
about 67% by the end of the simulation. This is because when contributors cannot
download from free riders over time, they start dropping their IN-connections
from free riders; hence free riders lose their OUT-connections to contributors.
Figure 6.20 shows the number of isolated free riders over time. As time has
passed, more free riders were isolated from the network (they lost all their OUT-
connections). At the end of the simulation time, a total of 24 free riders (out of
630) were isolated.
These results show that PCMP updates the topology eﬀectively according to the
contributions of peers: it increases the connectivity among contributors, reduces
the connectivity of free riders towards the contributors, and can totally isolate
some free riders from the P2P network.
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Figure 6.21: Decrease in free riding peers’ downloads.
6.2.3.2 Impact of PCMP on P2P Network Performance
This section evaluates the eﬀectiveness of our protocol in terms of the performance
metrics described in Section 6.2.2.
Downloads of free riders: As Figure 6.21 depicts, the number of downloads by
free riders dropped when PCMP was applied. PCMP decreases OUT-connections
of free riders towards contributors, and this reduces the chance of getting a hit
on the queries. In this way, the number of downloads by free riders is reduced.
Both C-PCMP and T-PCMP reduces the downloads. C-PCMP caused a 14%
reduction, whereas T-PCMP achieved a 16% reduction.
Downloads of contributors: It is desirable to increase the number of downloads for
contributors. Since each peer’s upload capacity is limited, the download requests
of contributors can sometimes be rejected. The rate of rejection is higher when
there are many free riders in the system, so eliminating the eﬀects of free riders on
the P2P network will help to increase the number of downloads that contributors
can make. This is indeed shown in Figure 6.22; applying our PCMP methods
achieved an increase in downloads performed by contributors by 51%.
Figure 6.22 shows that the improvement in downloads is slightly higher with T-
PCMP than with C-PCMP. While T-PCMP yielded an improvement of about
51%, the improvement when C-PCMP was used was about 46%.
Uploads of contributors: A metric that can indicate the load on a peer is the
number of uploads performed by the peer in a given time period. As shown
above, PCPM increments the number of contributors’ downloads considerably
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Figure 6.22: Increase in contributors’ downloads.
Figure 6.23: Change in contributors’ uploads when PCMP is applied.
and reduces the downloads of free riders signiﬁcantly. In simulation experiments,
we observed a slight increase (about 4%) in the number of uploads performed
by contributors when PCMP is applied (see Figure 6.23). However, this slight
increase is the result of PCMP’s success in reconnecting contributing peers to
each other. Contributors can download more from each other due to the fact
that their searches can reach more contributors by applying PCMP.
Download Cost: The load on a contributor can also be deﬁned as the ratio of its
uploads to its downloads. The results of our experiments show that PCMP also
causes a reduction in the download cost of contributors. As shown in Figure 6.24,
both T-PCMP and C-PCMP achieve a reduction of about 30% in the download
cost for contributors.
Number of P2P protocol messages: The number of P2P protocol messages trans-
mitted in the network is an important factor aﬀecting scalability and bandwidth
eﬃciency. PCMP results in a reduction of up to 36% in the number of transmit-
ted P2P protocol messages (Query and Query Hit messages) originating from and
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Figure 6.24: Decrease in contributors’ download cost.
Figure 6.25: Decrease in P2P messages from free riders.
destined to free riders (Figure 6.25). This result shows that applying the pro-
posed PCMP helps a P2P network to handle more peers with less P2P messaging
overhead and the system becomes more scalable with respect to the peer popula-
tion. The reduction observed in the number of protocol messages is the result of
reducing or stopping the propagation of Query messages from free riders. As the
number of OUT-connections of free riders gets reduced, the propagation of Query
and Query Hit messages for free riders will get reduced as well. The reduction of
control traﬃc in a P2P network also means a reduction in the overhead imposed
on the underlying infrastructure. This reduction translates to a better utilization
of available bandwidths and to a decreased processing load on each peer.
Fairness: We explored how PCMP reacts to the changes in the behavior of peers.
A peer can behave as a free rider at ﬁrst, but later, after observing the decrease
in the service it gets, begin to share its resources. If PCMP does not react to
these kinds of changes, it will be unfair and moreover it cannot accomplish one
of its primary goals, promoting contribution.
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 100
Figure 6.26: Downloads of the probe node according to when it begins to share
its ﬁles.
To observe the fairness of PCMP, we conducted the following experiment. We
randomly selected a probe node which initially behaved as a free rider. After a
certain amount of time, the node changed its sharing attitude and began to share
its ﬁles. We compared the level of service it got from the P2P network when it
was behaving as a free rider and when it was sharing its ﬁles. The number of
downloads that could be performed by the probe peer is depicted in Figure 6.26.
As can be seen in the ﬁgure, when the peer begins to change its sharing attitude
at a given time from free riding to contributing, PCMP reacts in a positive way
and allows the peer to download more ﬁles.
6.2.4 Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Parameter Values
We executed sensitivity experiments to observe how PCMP performs under vary-
ing values of important parameters: the number of peers and the level of free
riding. We also observed the performance results for diﬀerent ﬁle sizes and diﬀer-
ent levels of ﬁle replications. Under all diﬀerent parameter settings, PCMP was
observed to provide performance gains.
• The number of peers in the simulated network: Considering the size of a
real Gnutella network, the number of peers simulated in our work can be
considered to be very small. However, since our proposed method requires
only local interactions between neighbors, we do not expect the impact
of the number of peers on the network’s performance to be considerable.
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 101
Figure 6.27: The number of contributors’ downloads when diﬀerent numbers of
peers are simulated.
Figure 6.28: The number of contributors’ downloads when diﬀerent free rider
populations are simulated.
This is indeed what we have observed in the results of our experiments
that were performed for various network sizes: 400, 900, 1600, 2500, and
4900 peers. Figure 6.27 displays the performance in terms of the number of
contributor downloads. As shown in the ﬁgure, the number of downloads
by contributors is increased around 45% for all network sizes. Therefore,
we conclude that increasing the number of peers in the network does not
negatively aﬀect the performance of our framework, and that our framework
is scalable.
• The Size of Free Rider Population: We also evaluated the eﬀect of the
size of the free rider population. As seen in Figure 6.28, regardless of the
ratio of free riders, T-PCMP achieves more downloads, around 50%, for
contributors. Even at a low population ratio of free riders, the protocol
performs very well.
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File Type File Size Ratio
Very Small ∼ 0.3 10%
Small ∼5MB 50%
Medium ∼40MB 20%
Large ∼100MB 10%
Very Large >100MB 10%
Table 6.12: Properties of diﬀerent ﬁle sizes.
Figure 6.29: The number of contributors’ downloads with the existence of diﬀer-
ent ﬁle sizes.
• The File Size and File Replication: In Section 6.2.1, we assumed that each
ﬁle is of the same size and the number of copies for each ﬁle is identical. In
this section, we relax these assumptions by considering diﬀerent ﬁle sizes as
summarized in Table 6.12, and diﬀerent levels of ﬁle replication as shown in
Table 6.13. The values given in tables are based on the results of the P2P
network observations provided in [64, 65].
We proposed two connection replacement policies in Section 4.4, namely
T-PCMP and C-PCMP. To handle diﬀerent ﬁle sizes, we now propose a
new replacement method. In this method, the size of the ﬁle downloaded
from the neighboring peer is used to select the connection for replacement.
The connection with the least total amount of downloaded ﬁle is selected
as a victim. We call the PCMP protocol that applies this policy Size-based
PCMP (S-PCMP).
Figure 6.29 shows the results of diﬀerent ﬁle sizes on the contributor down-
loads. PCMP increases the contributor downloads as much as 55% com-
pared to Gnutella.
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NAME Group A (Ratio/Replication) Group B (Ratio/Replication)
RARE 10% of ﬁles: 1 copy. 90% of ﬁles: 4 copies.
POPULAR 10% of ﬁles: 40 copies. 90% of ﬁles: 4 copies.
UNIFORM All ﬁles : 4 copies All ﬁles : 4 copies
Table 6.13: Properties of diﬀerent levels of ﬁle replication.
Figure 6.30: The number of contributors’ downloads with diﬀerent levels of ﬁle
replication.
For evaluating the impact of diﬀerent ﬁle replication levels, we used three
ﬁle replication schemes as summarized in Table 6.13 . We split the ﬁles
into two groups and replicated them with diﬀerent factors. In the RARE
distribution, 10% of the ﬁles are rare (fewer replications) compared to 90%
of the ﬁles. Similarly, in the POPULAR distribution, 10% of the ﬁles are
more popular (more replications) than the rest of the ﬁles. In UNIFORM
(default) distribution all the ﬁles have the same number of copies.
The results of the simulation tests are depicted in Figure 6.30. The ﬁgure
summarizes the eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁle distribution schemes on the contribu-
tors downloads. With all the ﬁle distributions considered, PCMP performs
about 55% better than Gnutella. Total number of downloads of contribu-
tors is aﬀected by the distribution strategy of ﬁle copies. However, PCMP
manages to proﬁt the contributors with all diﬀerent types of ﬁle distribution
schemes evaluated.
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6.2.5 Possible Attacks
There are many diﬀerent kinds of attacks to the existing P2P network protocols.
Since we extend the Gnutella Protocol, we will not discuss the attacks and their
eﬀects related to the original Gnutella Protocol. Here we would like to discuss the
several possible attacks speciﬁc to the method we proposed against free riding.
6.2.5.1 A malicious peer does not comply with the proposed PCMP
rules
A malicious peer may refuse to add a contributor to its list of IN-connections
after downloading a ﬁle from the contributor. We claim that by doing this the
malicious peer cannot gain anything. It can only stop incoming Query and Ping
messages via its IN-connections. This, however, may decrease the search horizon
of the contributors.
If all free riders apply this attack, then contributors establish OUT-connections
only with other contributors, and this automatically helps them to become more
connected with each other. In the end, contributing peers will have an advantage
over free riders, since a peer has a restricted number of OUT-connections and a
contributor will not waste them for connections to free riders. Because, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, if a contributor uploads a ﬁle to a peer, the contributor will
update its OUT-connection with that peer. If there is no free OUT-connection,
then it will drop an existing OUT-connection and add the new peer. If the
dropped connection is with a contributor and the newly added connection is with
a free rider, the contributor will not beneﬁt from the new connection since free
riders do not share ﬁles. However, the contributors are not aware if a peer is
a free rider or not. If free riders reject IN-connection requests by not sending
a Pong message, then the contributors will not update their OUT-connections.
The contributors will only update their OUT-connections when they upload ﬁles
to other contributors, since other contributors will accept the IN-connection re-
quests by replying with Pong messages. Therefore, we expect that this attack
will not aﬀect the contributors much.
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Figure 6.31: The number of contributors’ downloads when free riders are nonco-
operative.
Figure 6.32: Increase in the number of connections among contributing peers
when free riders are noncooperative.
In order to observe the eﬀects of this possible attack, we designed a new simulation
setting. In this simulation, we assumed that all free riders would reject creating an
IN-Connection from a source peer after downloading a ﬁle. As seen in Figure 6.31,
this attack does not adversely aﬀect the download performance of the contributors
as compared to the results given in Figure 6.22. On the contrary, the contributors
can download slightly more ﬁles, because they become more closely connected to
each other, as seen in Figure 6.32.
6.2.5.2 A malicious peer replies with a faked Query Hit
To establish OUT-connections, a malicious peer can reply to a Query message as
if it has the ﬁle. However, when the querying peer demands the ﬁle, the malicious
peer can upload a fake ﬁle. But this will not help the malicious peer to establish
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an OUT-connection. Because, in PCMP, the connection between two peers is
established after a ﬁle is downloaded, and connection establishment is initiated
by the uploading peer through a Ping message. If the downloader peer is not
satisﬁed with the ﬁle, it will not send back a Pong message and the connection
will not be established. Therefore, the malicious peer cannot use this attack to
gain more OUT-connections.
6.2.5.3 A malicious peer behaves as a new-comer to gain more OUT-
connections
To increase the number of OUT-connections, a malicious peer can request OUT-
connections from peers as if it is a new peer in the network. If the peers accept all
newcomers’ connection requests without any limitations, the attacker can beneﬁt
from this situation. Jakobsson and Juels proposed a method of combating such
problems: proof of work (POW) protocols [51]. The main idea of these proto-
cols is that a prover demonstrates to a veriﬁer that it has expended a certain
level of computational eﬀort in a speciﬁed interval of time. POWs were proposed
as a mechanism for a number of security goals including server access metering,
construction of digital time capsules, uncheatable benchmarks, and protection
against spamming and other denial of service attacks. In our work, we can im-
plement POW to minimize these attacks to very low levels. Thus creating new
connections can cost time, limiting the ability of the attackers to request them
without a limit. We can include a rule in the general P2P protocol for initial
connections stating that clients are required to solve a puzzle, such as factoring
a number, before a Ping request is answered with a Pong message. The puzzles
could require additional work as resources become more scarce. This increases the
resources required by attackers to attack the system proportional to the threat of
the attack. A short lifetime on connections can also help to manage the network
and prevent this kind of attack.
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6.3 A Discussion on the Comparison of DPM
and PCMP
In Sections 6.1.3 and 6.2.3 we presented the detailed performance results of DPM
and PCMP, respectively, over a typical pure P2P network. In this section, we
provide a discussion about these frameworks comparing their characteristics and
performance gains.
6.3.1 Comparing Characteristics of DPM and PCMP
Both frameworks are designed to attack the free riding problem in pure P2P
networks by limiting the free riders’ ability to exploit the network resources.
However, their approaches to locating and countering free riders are considerably
diﬀerent. As a result, their eﬀects on the performance of a generic P2P network
diﬀer as well. Below we ﬁrst remark the similarities and diﬀerences between
these two frameworks, and then we summarize the simulation results with re-
spect to some important performance metrics, and discuss their advantages and
disadvantages over each other.
The similarities of the frameworks are as follows:
• DPM and PCMP frameworks are simple to implement, have low overhead
to run, fully comply with the concepts and protocols of pure P2P networks,
and are decentralized to operate eﬃciently.
• Both of the frameworks detect the free riders by monitoring local interac-
tions and mutually provided services.
• Since the frameworks solely depend on interactions between two peers and
each peer can make decision about other peers according to local informa-
tion, the frameworks are scalable with respect to the number of peers in
P2P network.
• Neither of them requires any kind of security infrastructures which makes
them practical and low-overhead to be implemented in pure P2P networks.
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• The frameworks are successful to reduce the impact of free riding on P2P
networks with respect to various performance metrics.
• They are resistant against the possible attacks of malicious peers.
• As we designed these solutions as frameworks, one can implement them in
a real world scenario by modifying their various parameters accordingly.
The frameworks have the following important diﬀerences:
• DPM’s counter-actions mainly either limit the search horizon of free riders
or stop the free rider searches ﬂooding into the P2P network. However,
PCMP breaks the connection with free riders and modify the P2P network
topology in such a way that free riders are pushed away from contributors
or, even more, free riders can be isolated.
• Implementation of DPM does not introduce any overhead for the P2P net-
work. On the other hand, PCMP requires updates in routing tables due
to changes in connections among peers. This does not necessarily mean a
signiﬁcant overhead for the system. Because, frequent disconnections and
unreliable links in pure P2P networks naturally require this kind of updates.
• DPM does not require any change in P2P network protocol whereas PCMP
does. A DPM implementation involves only modifying the client software of
the underlying P2P protocol. However, a PCMP implementation requires
modiﬁcation in both the client software and the P2P network protocols used
to implement and manage a new connection type, called One-Way-Request-
Connection (OWRC). Nevertheless, PCMP’s modiﬁcations required for the
network protocols are very simple and can be implemented at the applica-
tion level.
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6.3.2 Comparing Performance Results of DPM and
PCMP
A summary for the comparative simulation performance results is provided in
Table 6.14. In this table, the range of the given results is due to various imple-
mentation of the frameworks.
Metric DPM PCMP
# Downloads of free riders -89% .. -12% -16% .. -14%
# Downloads of contributors +10% .. +7% +51% .. +46%
# P2P messages -78% .. -68% -36% .. -34%
# Uploads of contributors -68% .. -35% +5% .. +4%
Download cost for contributors -65% .. -41% -30% .. -28%
Table 6.14: Summary of DPM and PCMP performance results over the simulated
pure P2P network.
When we examine the results, we ﬁrst notice that both frameworks improve the
performance of the base P2P network, namely Gnutella. DPM is much more
successful in punishing free riders compared to PCMP. The downloads of free
riders can be reduced down to 89% when DPM is employed. PCMP has a limited
success on reducing free riders downloads. However, PCMP can boost downloads
of contributors considerably, up to 51%. For this metric, DPM can not achieve
high performance.
Since DPM intervenes free riders at the search phase, it successfully reduces
the number of P2P messages. PCMP can push free riders to the outskirts of the
network and can isolate them. However, most of the free riders are still connected
to the network and can still submit queries. Thus, PCMP can not reduce the
number of P2P messages as much as that observed with DPM.
As a consequence of its success in reducing the downloads of free riders, DPM
reduces the uploads of contributors considerably. On contrary, as PCMP boosts
downloads of contributors signiﬁcantly, the uploads of contributors do not di-
minish at the same level as DPM. These results can be observed by comparing
download costs of these two frameworks as well.
In summary, we can argue that both frameworks are successful to fulﬁll the desired
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goal which is to reduce the adverse eﬀects of free riding on P2P networks and
prevent free riding peers from exploiting the network resources unresponsively in
the course of time. Additionally, we observe performance gains for contributors
and performance degradation for free riders by reducing the level of free riding and
its eﬀects. Thus, P2P networks employing the proposed free riding mechanisms
become more robust and scalable.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we propose two diﬀerent solutions, Detect and Punish Method
(DPM) and P2P Connection Management Protocol (PCMP), to counteract free
riding in pure P2P networks. In essence, we aim to reduce the amount of free
riding and its negative impacts on P2P networks and peers. As the performance
results of simulation experiments indicate, the solutions succeed in improving the
performance of the P2P networks in terms of the following metrics:
• the quality of services that peers can get from the network,
• the availability of content and services,
• the robustness of the system,
• the load balance on peers, and
• the scalability of the network.
Furthermore, simulation experiments prove that both solutions can cope with
possible counter attacks of malicious free riders and most of these attacks can
not render the proposed frameworks obsolete.
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In our ﬁrst solution, DPM, we provide a distributed and measurement based
framework against free riding. It is a framework consisting of tunable and change-
able algorithms. As part of the framework, we ﬁrst specify possible types of free
riding that can be encountered in a P2P network. Then we propose some mech-
anisms that can be used to detect free riders of the deﬁned types. We also
present sample counter actions that can be applied against the peers detected as
free riders. It is shown through evaluating DPM that employing the “dropping
single counter action” scheme against all kinds of detected free riders results in
better improvements for all the performance metrics used except the number of
downloads by contributors. We think that this result is due to false detection in
determining free riders. As one would like to increase the performance for con-
tributors, the usage of “mixed counter action” scheme is oﬀered. This scheme is
shown to be the best counter action increasing the number of contributor down-
loads, as well.
Our second solution, PCMP, is a novel approach employing a connection man-
agement protocol that can act against free riding in pure P2P networks. The
main idea of this solution is to adapt dynamically P2P network topology in order
to promote contribution in the network. PCMP manages the connections among
peers based on the amount of contributions by peers. Towards the solution, we
ﬁrst provide a new connection type, One-Way-Request Connection (OWRC), in
which the direction and the type of messages are well deﬁned. Then, we provide
a connection management protocol which connects peers to each other based on
their interactions. As a result, the contributors discover each other and get con-
nected to each other, while free riders loose connections to contributors, or even
they can be excluded from the network. In other words, the modiﬁed topology
supports the contributors to download more ﬁles from the other contributors and
process less queries from free riders.
As a conclusion, we show in our dissertation that;
• The impact and the level of free riding in P2P networks can be reduced if
proper mechanisms are implemented.
• Two diﬀerent solutions we proposed succeed in decreasing the downloads
of free riders while increasing the downloads of contributing peers.
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• Both solutions boost the scalability of P2P networks by signiﬁcantly reduc-
ing the P2P network traﬃc brought out by free riders.
• Free riders can attack the solutions through various methods, however they
can not beneﬁt from these attacks. The proposed solutions can still limit
the level of free riding in the presence of such attacks.
7.2 Future Work
As a future work, we plan to reﬁne the proposed free riding types in DPM to
enable the detection mechanism work better. We also plan to simulate diﬀerent
network topologies to demonstrate the properties of power-law and small-world
phenomena. Furthermore, we plan to integrate game theory into the simulated
peers so that peers can follow a strategy to maximize their utility from the system.
We ﬁnally would like to implement the proposed solutions into a Gnutella client
and test the solutions in an existing P2P network so that we can observe the
eﬀects of DPM and PCMP in real world applications.
Appendix A
Analyzing Eﬀects of PCMP
We here provide a motivational example about how we can improve the perfor-
mance in terms of some metrics in a P2P network using the P2P Connection
Management Protocol (PCMP) that we presented in Chapter 4.
The probability of getting a query hit depends on many factors including the
popularity of the requested ﬁle, the number of ﬁles shared by peers, and the
number of contributing peers in the search horizon. If we assume even popularity
and even number of shared ﬁles by each peer, then the number of contributing
peers in the search horizon will be the factor determining the hit probability of a
query. Therefore, increasing the number of contributors in the search horizon is
important for receiving better service from the P2P network.
In order to calculate the number of contributors that a contributing peer’s query
can reach, we ﬁrst make the following assumptions. In a P2P network there are
contributors and free riders. A peer is considered as a free rider if it does not
share any ﬁles at all. On the other hand, a peer is a contributor if it shares any
number of ﬁles. A Gnutella-like protocol is used for the query dissemination with
the time-to-live (TTL) value set to m. Each peer in the network has n one-hop
neighbors on the average. The number of peers in the network is so large that the
path followed by a ﬂooded query constitutes a tree, not a graph. In other words,
a query reaches distinct peers at each hop while getting ﬂooded from one hop to
the next. A contributor has p number of contributor neighbors and n−p number
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Figure A.1: The relationship between contributors (Cont.) and free riders (FR)
at diﬀerent levels.
of free rider neighbors. Similarly, a free rider peer has q number of contributor
neighbors and n− q number of free rider neighbors.
Let Xi denote the number of peers that are i hops away from the querying peer.
We also say Xi is the number of peers at level i. Xi can be computed easily.
Xi = n(n− 1)i−1, i ≥ 1 (A.1)
Some of these Xi peers are contributors and some are free riders. Let Ci be the
number of contributors and Fi be the number of free riders at level i. Thus, Xi
= Ci + Fi. As we deal with a contributor as the originator of the query, C0 = 1,
C1 = p, and F1 = n− p.
We compute Ci in a recursive manner. Figure A.1 shows the relationship between
contributors at level i− 2, i− 1, and i.
If we assume that Ci−2 is known then Fi−2 can be calculated as Fi−2 = Xi−2−Ci−2.
Upon receiving the query, Ci−2 number of contributing peers at level i − 2 will
forward it to their contributing neighbors (whose count is denoted with C1i−1)
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and to their free riding neighbors (whose count is denoted with F1i−1) at level
i − 1. Similarly, Fi−2 number of free riding peers at level i − 2 will forward the
query to their contributing neighbors (C2i−1) and to their free riding neighbors
(F2i−1) at level i− 1.
As indicated in Figure A.1, we can compute the number of contributors at level
i using the number of contributors and free riders at previous levels i − 1 and
i− 2. Each of the C1i−1 contributing peers at level i− 1 will forward their query
to p − 1 contributors 1. Then we obtain the following recursive relationship for
the number of contributors at level i:
Ci = C1i−1(p− 1) + F1i−1(q − 1) + C2i−1(p) + F2i−1(q),
Ci = C1i−1p− C1i−1 + F1i−1q − F1i−1 + C2i−1p + F2i−1q,
Ci = p(C1i−1 + C2i−1) + q(F1i−1 + F2i−1)− (C1i−1 + F1i−1).
We have the following equations:
C1i−1 + C2i−1 = Ci−1, and F1i−1 + F2i−1 = Xi−1 − Ci−1; and
C1i−1 + F1i−1 = Ci−2Yi−2.
Here, Yi is the number of neighbors that will receive a query originated or for-
warded by a peer i. If the peer is the query originator, i.e., i = 0, the number of
neighbors to whom the query will be forwarded is n. Otherwise, if the peer is a
query forwarder, the number of neighbors to whom the query will be forwarded
is n− 1. In short, if i is 0 then Yi is n, otherwise Yi is n− 1.
Now, the equation that gives the number of contributors at level i becomes:
Ci = pCi−1 + q(Xi−1 − Ci−1)− Yi−2Ci−2, i ≥ 2 (A.2)
As mentioned before, if the originator of the query is a contributor, C0 = 1 and
C1 = p.
As a result, the total number of contributors that will receive the query issued
by a contributor is:
1We have p− 1 not p because, those forwarding peers have a contributor parent that is also
a neighbor of them.
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C =
m∑
i=1
Ci = p +
m∑
i=2
(pCi−1 + q(Xi−1 − Ci−1)− Yi−2Ci−2), m ≥ 2 (A.3)
We can use this recursive formula to compute the number of contributors for
various settings of the parameters m, n, p, and q. For example, in a P2P network,
each peer, a contributor or a free rider, has 2 contributing neighbors and 3 free
riding neighbors. That is, n = 5, p = 2, q = 2, and m = 5. Using Equation A.3,
the number of contributors that a contributing peer’s query can reach is computed
as 692. If we can control and modify the connections in this network (what we
aim with our approach) so that each contributor has 4 out of its 5 neighbors
as contributors (p = 4), then the number of contributors that will receive the
query message issued by a contributor would be 1132. If we can totally isolate
free riders, no free rider will have a connection to a contributor and vice versa.
This means, p becomes 5, and q becomes 0. In this case, the number of the
contributors that will receive the query would be 1706.
These examples show that we can improve the number of contributors in a search
horizon of a contributing peer so that the peer can get better search quality. This
is the main motivation for our approach.
After searching the network and receiving the query hits, a peer requests download
from one of the source peers. However, source peers are subject to high number
of download requests and since the upload capacity is limited, they can refuse
some of the download requests. Therefore, receiving a query hit does guarantee
a successful download.
Assume that on the average a contributor can upload U number of ﬁles simul-
taneously at maximum, and the number of simultaneous download requests that
arrive to this contributor is D. Sometimes, contributors can have much more
download requests (D) than their upload capacity (U). In that case, when D is
larger than U , a contributor will refuse a download request with a probability
P (refuse) = 1 − U/D. As the ratio of free riders in a P2P network becomes
greater than that of contributors, most of these requests will belong to the free
riders. As stated above, we aim to reduce the arrival of download requests from
free riders. Therefore, we expect a reduction in P (refuse) for the requests coming
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from contributors. Hence, we expect an increase in the downloads that contrib-
utors can achieve.
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